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Abstract
We study the problem of distribution testing when the samples can only be accessed us-
ing a locally differentially private mechanism and focus on two representative testing questions
of identity (goodness-of-fit) and independence testing for discrete distributions. We are con-
cerned with two settings: First, when we insist on using an already deployed, general-purpose
locally differentially private mechanism such as the popular Rappor or the recently introduced
Hadamard Response for collecting data, and must build our tests based on the data collected via
this mechanism; and second, when no such restriction is imposed, and we can design a bespoke
mechanism specifically for testing. For the latter purpose, we introduce the Randomized Aggre-
gated Private Testing Optimal Response (Raptor) mechanism which is remarkably simple and
requires only one bit of communication per sample.
We propose tests based on these mechanisms and analyze their sample complexities. Each
proposed test can be implemented efficiently. In each case (barring one), we complement our per-
formance bounds for algorithms with information-theoretic lower bounds and establish sample
optimality of our proposed algorithm. A peculiar feature that emerges is that our sample-optimal
algorithm based on Raptor uses public-coins, and any test based on Rappor or Hadamard
Response, which are both private-coin mechanisms, requires significantly more samples.
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1 Introduction
Locally differentially private (LDP) mechanisms have gained prominence as methods of choice for
sharing sensitive data with untrusted curators. This strong notion of privacy, introduced in [DJW13]
(see also [EGS03]) as a variant of differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06], requires each user to report
only a noisy version of its data such that the distribution of the reported data does not change
multiplicatively beyond a prespecified factor when the underlying user data changes. With the
proliferation of user data accumulated using such locally private mechanisms, there is an increasing
demand for designing data analytics toolkits for operating on the collated user data. In this paper,
we consider the design of algorithms aimed at providing a basic ability to such a toolkit, namely
the ability to run statistical tests for the underlying user data distribution. At a high-level, we seek
to address the following question.
How should one conduct statistical testing on the (sensitive) data of users, such that
each user maintains their own privacy both to the outside world and to the (untrusted)
curator performing the inference?
In particular, we consider two fundamental statistical inference problems for a discrete dis-
tribution over a large alphabet: identity testing (goodness-of-fit) and independence testing. A
prototypical example of the former is testing whether the user data was generated from a uniform
distribution; the latter tests if two components of user data vectors are independent. Our main
focus is the uniformity testing problem and most of the other results are obtained as an exten-
sion using similar techniques. We seek algorithms that are efficient in the number of LDP user
data samples required and can be implemented practically. These two problems are instances of
distribution testing, a sub-area of statistical hypothesis testing focusing on small-sample analysis
introduced by Batu et al. [BFR+00] and Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Ron [GGR98].
Our results are comprehensive, and organized along two axes: First, we consider tests that use
existing LDP data release mechanisms to collect inputs at the center and perform a post-processing
test on this aggregated data. Specifically, we consider the popular Rappor mechanism of [EPK14]
and the recently introduced the Hadamard Response mechanism (HR) of [ASZ18]. Because these
mechanisms have utility beyond our specific use-case of distribution testing – Rappor, for instance,
is already deployed in many applications – it is natural to build a more comprehensive data analytics
toolkit using the data accumulated by these mechanisms. To this end, we provide uniformity testing
algorithms with optimal sample complexity for both mechanisms; further, for HR, we also provide
an independence testing algorithm and analyze its performance.
Second, we consider the more general class of public-coin mechanisms for solving testing prob-
lems which are allowed to use public randomness. We present a new response mechanism, Random-
ized Aggregated Private Testing Optimal Response (Raptor), that only requires users to send a
single privatized bit indicating whether their data point is in a (publicly known) random subset of
the domain. Using Raptor, we obtain simple algorithms for uniformity and independence testing
that are sample-optimal even among public-coin mechanisms.
We next provide a detailed description of our results, followed by a discussion of the relevant
literature to put them in perspective. At the outset we mention that the problems studied here
have been introduced earlier in [She18, GR18]. Our algorithms outperform their counterparts from
these papers, and we complement them with information-theoretic lower bounds establishing their
optimality (except for the proposed HR-based independence test).
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1.1 Algorithms and results
The privacy level of a locally private mechanism is often parameterized by a single parameter
ε > 0. Specifically, an ε-LDP mechanism (cf. Duchi et al. [DJW13]) ensures that for any two
distinct values of user data, the distribution of the output reported to the curator is within a
multiplicative factor of eε; smaller values of ε indicate stronger privacy guarantees. In this work,
we focus on the high-privacy regime, and assume throughout that ε ∈ (0, 1]; however, our choice of
1 as an upper bound is to set a convention and can be replaced with any constant.
In uniformity testing, the user data comprises independent samples from an unknown k-ary
distribution. These samples are then made available to the curator through an ε-LDP mechanism,
and she seeks to determine if the underlying distribution was uniform or γ-far from uniform in total
variation distance. How many locally private samples must the curator access?
First, we consider two representative locally private mechanisms, Rappor and HR. We briefly
describe these mechanisms here informally and provide a more complete definition in Section 2.
In Rappor, the k-ary observation of the user is first converted to a k-length vector using one-hot
encoding, and then each bit of this vector is independently flipped with probability 1/(1+eε). HR,
on the other hand, is a generalization of the classic Randomized Response (RR) [War65] which
roughly maps each k-ary observation x to either a randomly chosen +1 entry of the x-th row of
the k × k Hadamard matrix with probability eε/(1 + eε), or to a randomly chosen −1 entry with
probability 1/(1+eε). Interestingly, both these mechanisms have been shown recently to be sample-
optimal for learning k-ary distributions; see [DJW17, EPK14, WHW+16, YB17, KBR16, ASZ18].
Further, note that both Rappor and HR are private-coin mechanisms, and are symmetric across
users.
We propose the following algorithm to enable uniformity testing using data obtained via Rap-
por. Once again, the description here is brief and a formal description is provided in Section 3.1.
Algorithm 1 Uniformity testing using Rappor
1: Obtain Z1, . . . , Zn using Rappor.
2: For each x in [k], compute the number Nx of k-bit vectors Zi for which the x-th entry is 1.
3: Compute the test statistic T described in (11) which is, in essence, a bias-corrected version of
the collision statistic
∑
x(N
2
x −Nx).
4: If T is more than roughly n2γ2ε2/k, declare uniform; else declare not uniform.
We analyze the sample complexity of the above test and show that it is order-wise optimal among
all tests that use Rappor.
Result 1 (Sample complexity of uniformity testing using Rappor). The uniformity test de-
scribed above requires O(k3/2/(γ2ε2)) samples. Furthermore, any test using Rappor must use
Ω(k3/2/(γ2ε2)) samples.
Moving now to HR, denote by q∗ the output distribution of HR when the underlying samples
are generated from the uniform distribution. (Note that q∗ can be computed explicitly.) Invoking
Parseval’s theorem, we show that the ℓ2 distance between the q∗ and the output distribution of HR
is roughly ε/
√
k times the ℓ2 distance between the uniform and the user data distributions. This
motivates the following test.
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Algorithm 2 Uniformity testing using HR
1: Obtain Z1, . . . , Zn using HR.
2: Using an appropriate ℓ2-test, test if the ℓ2 distance between the distribution of Zi’s and q∗ is
less than roughly γε/k; in this case declare uniform. Else declare not uniform.
Our next result shows that this test is indeed sample-optimal among all tests using HR.
Result 2 (Sample complexity of uniformity testing using HR). The uniformity test described
above requires O(k3/2/(γ2ε2)) samples. Furthermore, any test using HR must use Ω(k3/2/(γ2ε2))
samples.
Both tests proposed above thus provably cannot be improved beyond this barrier of Ω(k3/2/(γ2ε2))
samples. Interestingly, this was conjectured by Sheffet to be the optimal sample complexity of lo-
cally private uniformity testing [She18], although no algorithm achieving this sample complexity
was provided. Yet, our next result shows that one can achieve the same guarantees with much
fewer samples when public randomness is allowed.
Specifically, we describe a new mechanism Raptor, described below:
Algorithm 3 The Raptor mechanism
1: The curator and the users sample a uniformly random subset S of [k] of cardinality k/2.
2: Each user computes the bit indicator Bi = 1{Xi∈S} and sends it using RR, i.e., flips it with
probability 1/(1 + eε) and sends the outcome to the curator.
The key observation is that when the underlying distribution is γ-far from uniform, the bias of Bi
is 1/2+Ω(γ/
√
k) with constant probability (over the choice of S); while clearly, under uniform the
bits Bi are unbiased. Thus, we can simply test for uniformity by learning the bias of the bit up
to an accuracy of γ/
√
k, which can be done using O(k/(γ2ε2)) samples from Raptor. In fact, we
further show that (up to constant factors) this number of samples cannot be improved upon.
Result 3 (Sample complexity of locally private uniformity testing). Uniformity testing using Rap-
tor requires O(k/(γ2ε2)) samples. Furthermore, any public-coin mechanism for locally private
uniformity testing requires Ω(k/(γ2ε2)) samples.
Although we have stated the previous three results for uniformity testing, our proofs extend
easily to identity testing, i.e., the problem of testing equality of the underlying distribution to a fixed
known distribution q which is not necessarily uniform. In fact, if we allow simple preprocessing
of user observations before applying locally private mechanisms, a reduction argument due to
Goldreich [Gol16] can be used to directly convert identity testing to uniformity testing.
Our final set of results are for independence testing, where user data consists of two-dimensional
vectors (Xi, Yi) from [k] × [k]. We seek to ascertain if these vectors were generated from an inde-
pendent distribution p1 ⊗ p2 or a distribution that is γ-far in total variation distance from every
independent distribution. For this problem, a natural counterpart of Raptor which simply applies
Raptor to each of the two coordinate using independently generated sets yields a sample optimal
test – indeed, we then simply need to test if the pair of indicator-bits are independent or not. This
can be done using O(k2/(γ2ε2)), leading to the following result.
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Result 4 (Sample complexity of locally private independence testing). The sample complexity
of locally private independence testing is Θ(k2/(γ2ε2)) and is achieved by a simple public-coin
mechanism that applies Raptor to each coordinate of user data.
For completeness, we also present a private-coin mechanism for independence testing based on
HR which requires O(k3/(γ2ε4)) samples. The proposed test builds on a technique introduced in
Acharya, Daskalakis, and Kamath [ADK15] and relies on learning in χ2 divergence. Although this
result is suboptimal in the dependence on the privacy parameter ε, it improves on both [She18] and
the testing-by-learning baseline approach by a factor of k. We summarize all our results in Table 1
and compare them with the best known prior bounds from [She18].
This work Previous [She18]
Private-Coin Public-Coin Private-Coin
Uniformity Testing O
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
 ⋆ Θ
(
k
γ2ε2
)
 O
(
k2
γ2ε2
)
6
Independence Testing O
(
k3
γ2ε4
)
 Θ
(
k2
γ2ε2
)
 O
(
k4
γ2ε2
)
6
Table 1: Summary of our results and previous work. The independence testing results hold for
independence testing of distributions over [k] × [k]; the symbol  (resp. 6) indicates a symmetric
(resp. asymmetric) mechanism. Finally, ⋆ indicates that the upper bound is tight (in all parameters)
for the subclass of private mechanisms our mechanisms belong to.
1.2 Proof techniques
We start by describing the analysis of our tests based on existing ε-LDP mechanisms. Recall that a
standard (non-private) uniformity test entails estimating the ℓ2 norm of the underlying distribution
by counting the number of collisions in the observed samples. When applying the same idea on the
data collected via Rappor, we can naively try to estimate the number of collisions by adding the
number of pairs of output vectors with 1s in the x-th coordinate, for each x. However, the resulting
statistic has a prohibitively high variance stemming from the noise added by Rappor. We fix
this shortcoming by considering a bias-corrected version of this statistic that closely resembles the
classic χ2 statistic. However, analyzing the variance of this new statistic turns out to be rather
technical and involves handling the covariance of quadratic functions of correlated binomial random
variables. Our main technical effort in this part goes into analyzing this covariance, which may
find further applications.
For our second test that builds on HR, we follow a different approach. In this case, we exploit
the structure of Hadamard transform and take recourse to Parseval’s theorem to show that the
ℓ2 distance to uniformity of the original distribution p is equal, up to an ε/
√
k factor, to the ℓ2
distance of the Fourier transform H(p) to some (explicit) fixed distribution q; further, it can be
shown that ‖q‖2 = O(1/
√
k). With this structural result in hand, we can test identity of H(p) to
q in the Fourier domain, by invoking the non-private ℓ2 tester of Chan et al. [CDVV14] with the
corresponding distance parameter γε/
√
k. Exploiting the fact that q has a small ℓ2 norm leads to
the stated sample complexity.
Our private-coin mechanism for independence testing uses HR as well, and once again hinges on
the idea that testing and learning in the Fourier domain can be done efficiently. To wit, we adapt the
“testing-by-learning” framework of Acharya, Daskalakis, and Kamath [ADK15] (which they show
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can be applied to many testing problems, including independence testing) to our private setting.
The main insight here is that instead of using HR to learn and test the original distribution p in χ2
distance, we perform both operations directly in the transformed domain to the distribution at the
output of HR. Namely, we first learn the transform of p1⊗p2, then test whether the outcome is close
to the transform of p. The main challenge here is to show that the variant of Hadamard transform
that we use preserves (as was the case for uniformity testing) the ℓ2 distance from independence.
We believe this approach to be quite general, as was the case in [ADK15], and that it can be used
to tackle many other distribution testing questions such as locally private testing of monotonicity
or log-concavity.
As mentioned above, our main results – the optimal public-coin mechanisms for identity and
independence testing – are remarkably simple. The key heuristic underlying both can be sum-
marized as follows: If p is γ-far from uniform, then with constant probability a uniformly random
subset S ⊆ [k] of size k/2 will satisfy p(S) = 1/2 ± Ω(γ/√k); on the other hand, if p is uniform
then p(S) = 1/2 always holds. Thus, one can reduce the original testing problem (over alphabet
size k) to the much simpler question of estimating the bias of a coin. This latter task is very easy
to perform optimally in a locally private manner – for instance it can be completed via RR – and
requires each player to send only one bit to the server. Hence, the main technical difficulty is to
prove this quite intuitive claim. We do this by showing anticoncentration bounds for a suitable
random variable by bounding its fourth moment and invoking the Paley–Zygmund inequality. As
a byproduct, we end up establishing a more general version, Theorem 14, which we believe to be
of independent interest.
Our information-theoretic lower bounds are all based on a general approach introduced recently
by Acharya, Canonne, and Tyagi [ACT18] (in a non-private setting) that allows us to handle the
change in distances between distributions when information constraints are imposed on samples.
We utilize the by-now-standard “Paninski construction” [Pan08], a collection C of 2k/2 distribu-
tions obtained by adding a small pointwise perturbation to the k-ary uniform distribution. In
order to obtain a lower bound for the sample complexity of locally private uniformity testing, fol-
lowing [ACT18], we identify such a mechanism to the n noisy channels (Wj : [k] → {0, 1}∗)j∈[n]
(that is, the randomized mappings used by the n players) it induces on the samples and consider
the distributionW(p) of the tuple of n messages when the underlying distribution of the samples is
p. The key step then is to bound the χ2 divergence between (i) W(u), the distribution of the mes-
sages under the uniform distribution; and (ii) Ep∈C[W(p)], the average distribution of the messages
when p is chosen uniformly at random among the “perturbed distributions.”
Using the results of [ACT18], this in turn is tantamount to obtaining an upper bound the Frobe-
nius norm of specific [k/2] × [k/2] matrices H1, . . . ,Hn that capture the information constraints
imposed by Wj ’s. Deriving these bounds for Frobenius norms constitutes the main technical part
of the lower bounds and relies on a careful analysis of the underlying mechanism and of the LDP
constraints it must satisfy.
On the range of parameters. As pointed out earlier, in this work we focus on the high-privacy
regime, i.e., the case when the privacy parameter ε is small and the privacy constraints on the
mechanisms are the most stringent. From a technical standpoint, this allows us to rewrite the
expressions such as e
ε−1
eε+1 and
eε/2−1
eε/2+1
, which appear frequently, as simply Θ(ε) and greatly simplifies
the statements of our results. However, our results carry through to the general setting of large ε,
with e
ε−1
eε+1 replacing Θ(ε) term; the former is Θ(1) for large ε.
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1.3 Related prior work
Testing properties of a distribution by observing samples from it is a central problem in statistics
and has been studied for over a century. Motivated by applications arising from algorithms dealing
with massive amounts of data, it has seen renewed interest in the computer science community
under the broad title of distribution testing, with a particular focus on sample-optimal algorithms
for discrete distributions. This literature itself is over two decades old; we refer an interested reader
to surveys and books [Rub12, Can15, Gol17, BW17] for a comprehensive review. Here, we only
touch upon works that are related directly to our paper.
Sample complexity for uniformity testing was settled in [Pan08], following a long line of work.
The related, and more general, problem of identity testing has seen revived interest lately. The
sample complexity for this problem was shown to be Θ(k1/2/γ2) in [VV17], and by now even the
optimal dependence on the error probability is known (cf. [HM13, DGPP16]). Moreover, a work of
Goldreich [Gol16] further shows that any uniformity testing algorithm implies an identity testing
one with similar sample complexity. Another variant of this problem, termed “instance-optimal”
identity testing and introduced in [VV17], seeks to characterize the dependence of the sample
complexity on the distribution q we are testing identity to, instead of the alphabet size. As pointed
out in [ACT18], the reduction from [Gol16] can be used in conjunction with results from [BCG17] to
go through even for the instance-optimal setting. This observation allows us to focus on uniformity
testing only, even when local privacy constraints are imposed.
The optimal sample complexity for the independence testing problem where both observations
are from the same set1 [k] was shown to be Θ(k/γ2) in [ADK15, DK16].
Moving now to distribution testing settings with privacy constraints, the setting of differentially
private (DP) testing has by now been extensively studied. Here the algorithm itself is run by
a trusted curator who has access to all the user data, but needs to ensure that the output of
the test maintains differential privacy. Private identity testing in this sense has been considered
in [CDK17, ADR17], with a complete characterization of sample complexity derived in [ASZ17].
Interestingly, in several parameter ranges of interest the sample complexity here matches the sample
complexity for the non-private case discussed earlier, showing that “privacy often comes at no
additional cost” in this setting. As we show in this work, this is in stark contrast to what can be
achieved in the more stringent locally private setting.
We are not aware of any existing private algorithm for DP independence testing. While the
literature on DP testing includes several interesting mechanisms, for instance the works [GLRV16,
KR17, WLK15] which contain mechanisms for both identity and independence testing, finite-sample
guarantees are not available and the results hold only in the asymptotic regime.
Finally, coming to the literature most closely related to our work, locally private hypothesis
testing was considered first by Sheffet in [She18] where, too, both identity and independence test-
ing were considered. This work characterized the sample complexity of LDP independence and
uniformity testing when using Randomized Response, and introduced more general mechanisms.
However, as pointed-out in Table 1, the algorithms proposed in [She18] require significantly more
samples than our sample-optimal algorithms for those questions. Moreover, the overall sample
complexity without restricting to any specific class of mechanisms has not been considered.
An interesting concern studied in Sheffet’s work is the distinction between symmetric and
asymmetric mechanisms. Broadly speaking, the latter are locally private mechanisms where each
1The more general question asks to test independence of distributions over [k1]× [k2], or even over [k1]×· · ·× [kd].
Optimal (non-private) sample complexities for these generalizations are also known [DK16].
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player applies the same randomized function W to its data, where asymmetric mechanisms allow
different behaviors, with player i using its ownWi. While we mention this distinction in our results
(see Table 1), we observe in Lemma 4 that allowing asymmetric mechanisms can only improve the
sample complexity by at most a logarithmic factor.
Another class of problems of statistical inference requires learning the unknown distribution up
to a desired accuracy of γ in total variation distance. Clearly, the testing problems we consider can
be solved by privately learning the distributions (to accuracy γ). The optimal sample complexity
of locally private learning discrete k-ary distributions is known to be Θ(k2/(γ2ε2)); see [DJW17,
EPK14, YB17, KBR16, ASZ18]. (Furthermore, all these sample-optimal learning schemes are
symmetric.) This readily implies a sample complexity upper bound of O(k2/(γ2ε2)) for locally
private identity testing, and of O(k4/(γ2ε2)) for independence testing. In this respect the theoretical
guarantees from [She18] are either implied or superseded by this “testing-by-learning” approach.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We write [k] for the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , k}, and denote by log and ln the binary and natural
logarithms, respectively. We make extensive use of the standard asymptotic O(·), Ω(·), and Θ(·)
notation; moreover, we shall sometimes use an . bn, a & bn, and an ≍ bn for their non-asymptotic
counterparts (i.e., an . c1bn, a & c1bn, and c1an ≤ bn ≤ c2an for every n, where c1, c2 > 0 are
absolute constants).
Following the standard setting of distribution testing, we consider probability distributions over
a discrete (and known) domain Ω. Denote by ∆(Ω) the set of all such distributions,
∆(Ω) =

 p : [k]→ [0, 1] :
∑
x∈Ω
p(x) = 1

 ,
endowed with the total variation distance (statistical distance) as a metric, defined as dTV(p, q) =
supS⊆Ω(p(S)− q(S)). It is easy to see that dTV(p, q) = 12‖p − q‖1, where ‖p − q‖1 is the ℓ1 distance
between p and q as probability mass functions. For a distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1], we say that
p, q ∈ ∆(Ω) are γ-far if dTV(p, q) > γ; otherwise, they are γ-close. We denote by p1 ⊗ p2 the
product distribution over [k1]× [k2] defined by (p1 ⊗ p2)(x1, x2) = p1(x1) · p2(x2), for p1 ∈ ∆([k1]),
p2 ∈ ∆([k2]).
In distribution testing, for a prespecified set of distributions C ⊆ ∆(Ω) and given independent
samples from an unknown p ∈ ∆(Ω), our goal is to distinguish between the cases (i) p ∈ C and
(ii) p is γ-far from every q ∈ C with constant probability2. The sample complexity of testing C is
defined as the minimum number of samples required to achieve this task in the worst case over all
p ∈ ∆(Ω) (as a function of γ, |Ω|, and all other relevant parameters of C).
The specific problem of identity testing corresponds to Ω = [k] and C = {q} for some fixed
and known q ∈ ∆([k]). Uniformity testing is the special case of identity testing with q being the
uniform distribution, i.e., q(x) = 1/k for all x ∈ [k]. Lastly, independence testing corresponds to
Ω = [k]× [k] and C := { p1 ⊗ p2 : p1, p2 ∈ ∆([k]) }.
2As is typical, we set that probability to be 2/3; by a standard argument, this can be amplified to any 1 − δ at
the price of an extra O(log(1/δ)) factor in the sample complexity and running time.
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2.1 Local Differential Privacy
We consider the standard setting of ε-local differential privacy, which we recall below. A 1-user
mechanism is simply a randomized mapping which, given as input user data x ∈ X , outputs a
random variable Z taking values in Z. We represent this mechanism by a channel W : X → Z
where W (z | x) denotes the probability that the mechanism outputs z when the user input is x.
Similarly, an n-user mechanism is represented by W = (Wj : X → Y)j≥0 where Wj denotes the
channel used for the j-th user; when n is clear from context, we will simply use mechanism for an
n-user mechanism. For our purposes, X will be the domain of our discrete probability distributions,
[k], and Z will be identified with {0, 1}ℓ, for some integer ℓ ≥ 0.
Note that each channel Wj is applied independently to each user’s data. In particular, for inde-
pendent samples X1, . . . ,Xn, the outputs Z1, . . . , Zn of W are independent, too. The mechanisms
described above are private-coin mechanisms: they only require independent, local randomness at
each user to implement the local channels W1, . . . ,Wn. A private-coin mechanism is further said
to be symmetric if Wj is the same for all j, in which case, with an abuse of notation, we denote
it W : X → Z. A broader class of mechanisms of interest to us are public-coin mechanisms, where
the output of each user may depend additionally on shared public randomness U (independent
of the users’ data); when the shared randomness takes the value u, the mechanism uses channels
W uj . Clearly, private-coin mechanisms are a special case, corresponding to constant U . The above
distinction between symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms applies to public-coin mechanisms as
well.
A public-coin mechanismW is an ε-locally differentially private (ε-LDP) mechanism if it satisfies
the following:
max
u
max
z∈Y
max
x,x′∈X
W uj (z | x′)
W uj (z | x)
≤ eε, ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (1)
2.2 Existing LDP mechanisms
Three LDP mechanisms will be of interest to us: randomized response, Rappor, and Hadamard
response.
Randomized response. The k-randomized response (k-RR) mechanism [War65] is an ε-LDP
mechanism, WRR, with Z = X = [k], such that
WRR(z | x) :=
{
eε
eε+k−1 if z = x,
1
eε+k−1 otherwise.
(2)
Originally introduced for the binary case (k = 2), it is one of the simplest and most natural response
mechanisms.
Rappor. The randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response (Rappor) is an ε-
LDP mechanism introduced in [DJW13, EPK14]. Its simplest implementation, k-Rappor, maps
X = [k] to Z = [2k] in two steps. First, a one-hot encoding is applied to the input x ∈ [k] to obtain
a vector y ∈ {0, 1}k such that yj = 1 for j = x and yj = 0 for j 6= x. The privatized output,
z ∈ Z, of k-Rappor is represented by a k-bit vector obtained by independently flipping each bit
of y independently with probability 1
eε/2+1
.
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Note that if x is drawn from p ∈ ∆(k), this leads to z ∈ {0, 1}k such that the coordinates are
(non-independent) Bernoulli random variables with zi distributed as Bern(αR · p(i) + βR) where
αR, βR are defined as
αR :=
eε/2 − 1
eε/2 + 1
=
ε
4
+ o(ε), βR :=
1
eε/2 + 1
=
1
2
+ o(1). (3)
Hadamard Response. Hadamard response is a symmetric, communication- and time-efficient
mechanism, proposed in [ASZ18].
In order to define the Hadamard response mechanism, we first define a general family of ε-LDP
mechanisms that include RR as a special case. Let s ≤ K be two integers, and for each x ∈ X = [k]
let Cx ⊆ Z = [K] be a subset of size with |Cx| = s. Then, the general privatization scheme is
described by
∀z ∈ [K], W (z | x) :=
{
eε
seε+K−s if z ∈ Cx,
1
seε+K−s if z ∈ Z \Cx
(4)
which can easily be seen to be ε-LDP. Further, note that k-RR corresponds to the special case
with K = k, s = 1, and Cx = {x} for all x.
The Hadamard Response mechanism (HR), is obtained by choosing s = K/2, and a collection
of sets (Cx)x∈[k] such that
(A) For every x ∈ [k], |Cx| = s = K2 .
(B) For every distinct x, x′ ∈ [k], the symmetric difference ∆(Cx, Cx′) satisfies |∆(Cx, Cx′)| = s.
For these parameters, we get that
W (z | x) =
{
2
K · e
ε
eε+1 if z ∈ Cx,
2
K · 1eε+1 if z ∈ Z \ Cx,
∀z ∈ [K]. (5)
Let q(p,Cx) denote the probability that the privatized output z lies in Cx, when the input distri-
bution is p. Then, from (A) and (B) it can be seen that
Pr[Z ∈ Cx | Z = x ] =
∑
z∈Cx
W (z | x) e
ε
eε + 1
, Pr[Z ∈ Cx | Z 6= x ] = 12
and combining these two
q(p,Cx) =
1
2
+
eε − 1
2(eε + 1)
p(x) . (6)
A method for constructing sets (Cx)x∈[k] that also allows efficient implementation of the resulting
mechanism was proposed in [ASZ18] using Hadamard codes (hence the name Hadamard Response).
Specifically, let
K := 2⌈log(k+1)⌉ (7)
so that k + 1 ≤ K ≤ 2(k + 1), and let HK ∈ {−1, 1}K×K be the Hadamard matrix of order K
(see Section 2.3 for more details). Hereafter, we identify each row of HK to a subset of [K]. As
K ≥ k + 1, we can pick an injection φ : [k]→ {2, . . . ,K} and map each x ∈ [k] to a distinct subset
Cx ⊆ [K] defined by the φ(x)-th row of HK. By Fact 1 in the next section, this family (Cx)x∈[k]
satisfies (A) and (B).
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2.3 Hadamard matrices and linear codes
Next, we recall some useful properties of Hadamard matrices which will be needed for our analysis
of HR-based tests.
Definition 1. Let M ≥ 1 be any power of two. The Hadamard matrix of order M , denoted HM ,
is the matrix of size M ×M defined recursively by Sylvester’s construction: (i) H1 :=
[
1
]
, and (ii)
for m ≥ 1,
H2m :=
[
H2m−1 H2m−1
H2m−1 −H2m−1
]
.
Note that all entries of HM are in {−1, 1}.
Fact 1. Let m ≥ 1 be any integer. Then, the Hadamard matrix H2m has the following properties:
(i) The first row of H2m is the all-one vector.
(ii) For every j ≥ 2, the j-th row of H2m is balanced, i.e, contains exactly 2m−1 entries equal to
1.
(iii) Every two distinct rows are orthogonal; that is, for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 2m, the i-th and j-th
row agree (resp. disagree) on exactly 2m−1 entries.
Fix any m ≥ 1. The Hadamard matrix H2m corresponds to the Walsh–Hadamard transform (or
Fourier transform; see, for example, [O’D14]). Specifically, for any two functions f, g : {0, 1}m → R,
define the inner product 〈f, g〉 over R{0,1}m as
〈f, g〉 := 1
2m
∑
x∈{0,1}m
f(x)g(x), (8)
and let ‖·‖ denote the norm induced by this inner product. Moreover, the functions χS : {0, 1}m →
R defined for every S ⊆ [m] by χS(x) = (−1)〈x,S〉 =
∏
i∈S(−1)xi form an orthonormal basis,
whereby every f : {0, 1}m → R can be uniquely written as
∀x ∈ {0, 1}m, f(x) =
∑
x∈{0,1}m
fˆ(S)χS(x) (9)
where fˆ(S) := 〈f, χS〉. The Walsh–Hadamard matrix specifies this transformation of basis. Specif-
ically, we note following standard fact:
Fact 2. Let m ≥ 1. Then, for every x ∈ {0, 1}m and subset S ⊆ [m] identified to its characteristic
vector s ∈ {0, 1}m, we have that
(H2m)s,x = (H2m)x,s = χS(x) .
This spectral view of Walsh–Hadamard matrix leads to Parseval’s Theorem, which is instru-
mental in design of our tests based on HR.
Theorem 3 (Parseval’s Theorem). For every function f : {0, 1}m → R,
‖f‖2 =
∑
S⊆[m]
fˆ(S)2 .
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2.4 On symmetry and asymmetry
While all the LDP mechanisms underlying our proposed sample-optimal tests in this paper can be
cast as symmetric mechanisms, the next result shows that asymmetric mechanisms can in any case
yield at most a logarithmic-factor improvement in sample complexity over symmetric ones.
Lemma 4. Suppose that there exists a private-coin (respectively public-coin) LDP mechanism for
some task T with n users and probability of success 5/6. Then, there exists a private-coin (respec-
tively public-coin) symmetric LDP mechanism for T with n′ = O(n log n) users and probability of
success 2/3.
Proof. LetW = (Wi)i∈[n] be the purported mechanism, with Wi : X → Y being the mapping of the
i-th user. We create a symmetric (randomized) mechanism W˜ : X → [n]× Y as follows: On input
x ∈ X , use private (respectively public) randomness to generate I ∈ [n] uniformly at random (and
independently of everything else); and output (I,WI(x)).3
Clearly, the resulting mechanism is symmetric. Further, by a standard coupon-collector argu-
ment, for n′ = O(n log n) we have that with probability at least 5/6, each i ∈ [n] will be drawn
at least once. Whenever this is the case, upon gathering all the outputs, the referee can then
select a subset of n outputs and simulate the original mechanism, having received the output of
W1, . . . ,Wn. Overall, the probability of failure is at most 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3 by a union bound.
2.5 A warmup for the binary case
We conclude this section with simple algorithms for identity and independence testing for the case
when Ω = {0, 1}, i.e, for support size k = 2. These algorithms will be used later in our optimal
tests based on Raptor.
2.5.1 Private estimation of the bias of a coin.
First, we deal with the problem of estimating the bias of a coin up to an additive accuracy of
±γ, when the outcomes of coin tosses can be accessed via an ε-LDP mechanism. Note that this
yields as a corollary an algorithm for identity testing over {0, 1}. Indeed, to test if the generating
distribution p equals q ∈ ∆({0, 1}) or is γ-far from it, we estimate probability p(0) to additive ±γ/2
and compare it with q(0). The following result is a folklore and is included for completeness.
Lemma 5 (Locally Private Bias Estimation, Warmup). For ε ∈ (0, 1], an estimate of the bias of
a coin with an additive accuracy of γ can be obtained using O
(
1/(γ2ε2)
)
samples via ε-LDP RR.
Moreover, any estimate of bias obtained via ε-LDP RR must use Ω
(
1/(γ2ε2)
)
samples.
Proof. Recall from (2) that an ε-LDP RR is described by the channel WRR(0 | 0) = W (1 | 1) =
eε
eε+1 . When a Bern(ρ) random variable passes through this channel, the output is a Bernoulli
random variable with mean
ρ′ := ρ
eε
eε + 1
+ (1− ρ) 1
eε + 1
=
1
eε + 1
+ ρ
eε − 1
eε + 1
.
Therefore, estimating ρ to ±γ using this mechanism is equivalent to estimating ρ′ to an additive
γ′ := e
ε+1
eε−1γ, which can be done with O(1/γ
′2) = O(1/(γ2ε2)) samples (the second as ε . 1).
3Note that for public-coin mechanisms, one can define W˜ : X → Y, as there is no need for a user to communicate
the random index I to the referee.
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It remains to prove optimality. For k = 2, it can shown that any ε-LDP scheme can be obtained
by passing output of an ε-LDP RR through another channel. Therefore, RR will require the least
number of samples for estimating the bias, and it suffices to show the claimed bound of Ω
(
1/(γ2ε2)
)
for RR. To that end, suppose we provide as input a Bernoulli random variable with bias 1/2 + γ
to RR. Then, the output has bias 12 + γ
eε−1
eε+1 =
1
2 + O(γε). On the other hand, when the input is
Bern(1/2), then the output is Bern(1/2) as well. Therefore, distinguishing between a Bern(1/2) and
a Bern(1/2 + γ) using samples from an ε-LDP RR is at least as hard as distinguishing Bern(1/2)
and Bern(1/2 +O(γε)) without privacy constraints. This latter task is known to require the stated
number of samples.
2.5.2 Independence testing over {0, 1} × {0, 1}
As a corollary of Lemma 5, we obtain an algorithm for locally private independence testing for
k = 2, which, too, will be used later in the paper.
Corollary 6. For ε ∈ (0, 1], there exists a symmetric, private-coin ε-LDP mechanism that tests
whether a distribution over {0, 1} × {0, 1} is a product distribution or γ-far from any product
distribution using O
(
1/(γ2ε2)
)
samples.
Proof. Consider a distribution p over {0, 1} × {0, 1} with marginals p1 and p2. Note that
|p(0, 0) − p1(0)p2(0)| = |p(x, y)− p1(x)p2(y)| , x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, if p is γ-far in total variation distance from any product distribution, it must hold that
dTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2) ≥ γ, which in view of the equation above yields |p(0, 0)− p1(0)p2(0)| ≥ γ/2. Using
this observation, we can test for independence using O(1/(ε2γ2)) samples as follows. First, note
that for any symbol x, p(x) can be estimated up to an accuracy γ using O(1/(ε2γ2)) samples
by converting the observation X to the binary observation 1{X=x} and applying the estimator of
Lemma 5. Thus, we can estimate p(0, 0), p1(0), and p2(0) up to an accuracy γ/16 by assigning
O(1/(ε2γ2)) samples each for them. Denote the respective estimates by p˜(0, 0), p˜1(0), and p˜2(0).
When p(0, 0) = p1(0)p2(0),
|p˜(0, 0) − p˜1(0)p˜2(0)| ≤ |p˜(0, 0) − p(0, 0)| + p˜1(0)− p1(0)| + |p˜2(0) − p2(0)| ≤ 316γ.
On the other hand, when |p(0, 0) − p1(0)p2(0)| ≥ γ/2, we have
|p˜(0, 0)−p˜1(0)p˜2(0)| ≥ |p(0, 0)−p1(0)p2(0)|−|p˜(0, 0)−p(0, 0)|−|p˜1(0)−p1(0)|−|p˜2(0)−p2(0)| ≥ 516γ.
Thus, for k = 2, locally private independence testing can be performed with O(1/(ε2γ2)) samples
by estimating the probabilities p(0, 0), p1(0), p2(0) and comparing |p˜(0, 0) − p˜1(0)p˜2(0)| to the
threshold γ/4.
3 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Existing Mechanisms
In this section, we provide two locally private mechanisms for uniformity testing. As discussed
earlier, this in turn provides similar mechanisms for identity testing as well. These two tests, based
respectively on the symmetric, private-coin mechanisms Rappor and HR, will be seen to have the
same sample complexity of O(k3/2/γ2ε2). However, the first has the advantage of being based on a
widespread mechanism, while the second is more efficient in terms of both time and communication.
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3.1 A mechanism based on Rappor
Given n independent samples from p, let the output of Rappor applied to these samples be
denoted by b1, . . . ,bn ∈ {0, 1}k , where bi = (bi1, . . . ,bik) for i ∈ [n]. The following fact is a simple
consequence of the definition of Rappor.
Fact 7. Let i, j ∈ [n], and x, y ∈ [k].
Pr[bix = 1,bjy = 1 ] =


(αRp(x) + βR)(αRp(y) + βR) if i 6= j
(αRp(x) + βR)(αRp(y) + βR)− α2Rp(x)p(y) if i = j, x 6= y
αRp(x) + βR if i = j, x = y
where αR, βR are defined as in (3).
First idea: Counting Collisions. A natural idea would be to try and estimate ‖p‖22 by counting
the collisions from the output of Rappor. Since this only adds post-processing to Rappor, which is
LDP, the overall procedure does not violate the ε-LDP constraint. For σxi,j defined as 1{bix=1,bjx=1},
x ∈ [k], i 6= j, the statistic S := ∑1≤i<j≤n∑x∈[k] σxi,j counting collisions over all samples and
differentially private symbols can be seen to have expectation
E[S] =
(
n
2
)(
α2R‖p‖22 + 2αRβR + kβ2R
)
≍ 1
2
ε2n2‖p‖22 +Θ(k) .
Up to the constant normalizing factor, this suggests an unbiased estimator for ‖p‖22, and thereby
also for ‖p − u‖22 = ‖p‖22− 1/k. However, the issue lies with the variance of this estimator. Indeed,
it can be shown that Var(S) ≈ n3k (for constant ε). Thus, if we use this statistic to distinguish
between ‖p‖22 = 1/k and ‖p‖22 > (1 + Ω(γ2))/k for uniformity testing, we need
√
n3k ≪ n2ε2 · γ
2
k
i.e., n ≫ k3/(γ4ε4). This sample requirement turns out to be off by a quadratic factor, and even
worse than the trivial upper bound obtained by learning p.
An Optimal Mechanism. We now propose our testing mechanism based on Rappor, which,
in essence, uses a privatized version of a χ2-type statistic of [CDVV14, ADK15, VV17]. For x ∈ [k],
let the number of occurrences of x among the n (privatized) outputs of Rappor be
Nx :=
n∑
j=1
1{bjx=1} (10)
which by the definition of Rappor follows a Bin(n, αRp(x) + βR) distribution. Now, letting
T :=
∑
x∈[k]
((
Nx − (n− 1)
(
αR
k
+ βR
))2
−Nx
)
+ k(n − 1)
(
αR
k
+ βR
)2
(11)
we get a statistic, applied to the output of Rappor, which (as we shall see) is up to normalization an
unbiased estimator for the squared ℓ2 distance of p to uniform. The main difference with the naive
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approach we discussed previously, however, lies in the extra linear term. Indeed, the collision-based
statistic was of the form
S ∝
∑
x∈[k]
(
N2x −Nx
)
,
and in comparison, keeping in mind that Nx is typically concentrated around its expected value of
roughly n/2, our new statistics can be seen to take the form
T ≈
∑
x∈[k]
(
N2x − nNx
)
+Θ(kn2),
since βR ≈ 1/2. That is, now the fluctuations of the quadratic term are reduced significantly by
the subtracted linear term, bringing down the variance of the statistic.
This motivates our testing algorithm based on Rappor, Algorithm 4, and leads to the main
result of this section:
Theorem 8. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 4 based on ε-LDP Rappor can test whether a distribution
is uniform or γ-far from uniform using
O
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
samples.
Algorithm 4 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Rappor
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n samples
1: Set
αR ← e
ε/2 − 1
eε/2 + 1
, βR ← 1
eε/2 + 1
as in (3).
2: Apply (ε-LDP) Rappor to the n samples to obtain (bi)1≤i≤n ⊲ Time O(k) per user
3: Compute Nx for every x ∈ [k], as defined in (10) ⊲ Time O(kn)
4: Compute T , as defined in (11) ⊲ Time O(k)
5: if T < n(n− 1)α2Rγ2/k then
6: return uniform
7: else
8: return not uniform
9: end if
Proof of Theorem 8. Clearly, since Rappor is an ε-LDP mechanism, the overall Algorithm 4 does
not violate the ε-LDP constraint. We now analyze the error performance of the proposed test,
which we will do simply by using Chebyshev’s inequality. Towards that, we evaluate the expected
value and the variance of T .
The following evaluation of expected value of statistic T uses a simple calculation entailing
moments of a Binomial random variable:
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Lemma 9. With T defined as above, we have
E[T ] = n(n− 1)α2R‖p− u‖22
where the expectation is taken over the private-coins used by Rappor and the samples drawn from
p. In particular, (i) if p = u, then E[T ] = 0; while (ii) if dTV(p, u) > γ, then E[T ] > 2n(n−1)α
2
Rγ
2
k .
Proof. Letting λ :=
(αR
k + βR
)
and using the fact that E
[
N2x
]
= E[Nx] + (1− 1n)E[Nx]2, we have
E[T ] =
∑
x∈[k]
E
[
(Nx − (n − 1)λ)2 −Nx
]
+ k(n − 1)λ2
=
∑
x∈[k]
(
E
[
N2x
]
− 2(n − 1)λE[Nx] + (n− 1)2λ2 − E[Nx]
)
+ k(n − 1)λ2
=
∑
x∈[k]
(
n− 1
n
E[Nx]
2 − 2(n − 1)λE[Nx] + n(n− 1)λ2
)
= n(n− 1)
∑
x∈[k]
(
E[Nx]
2
n2
− 2λE[Nx]
n
+ λ2
)
= n(n− 1)
∑
x∈[k]
(
E[Nx]
n
− λ
)2
,
which, along with the observation that E[Nx]n − λ = αR (p(x)− 1/k), gives the result.
Turning to the variance, we get the following:
Lemma 10. With T defined as above, we have
Var(T ) ≤ 4kn2 + 8n3α2R‖p − u‖22 = 4kn2 + 8nE[T ] .
The proof of this lemma is quite technical and relies on a tedious analysis of the covariance of the
random variables (Nx)x∈[k], in view of bounding quantities of the form Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny)). We
defer the details to Appendix B.
With these two lemmata, we are in a position to conclude the argument. Suppose n ≥ C · k3/2
α2
R
γ2
,
for some constant C > 0 to be specified later. Recall that αR = ε/4 + o(ε) when ε→ 0, leading to
the claimed sample complexity.
First, consider the case when p = u. In this case E[T ] = 0 and Var(T ) ≤ 4kn2 by Lemmas 9
and 10, and so by Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr
[
T ≥ n2α
2
Rγ
2
k
]
≤ k
2Var(T )
n4α4Rγ
4
≤ 17k
3
8n2α4Rγ
4
<
3
C2
which is at most 1/3 for C ≥ 3.
Next, when dTV(p, u) > γ, E[T ] > 2n
2 α
2
Rγ
2
k and Var(T ) ≤ 4kn2 + 8nE[T ], and again by
Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr
[
T < n2
α2Rγ
2
k
]
≤ Pr
[
T <
1
2
E[T ]
]
≤ 4Var(T )
E[T ]2
≤ 17k
3
2n2α4Rγ
4
+
10k
nα2Rγ
2
≤ 17
2C2
+
10
C
√
k
which is at most 1/3 for C ≥ 23. Taking C = 23 concludes the proof of Theorem 8.
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3.2 A mechanism based on Hadamard Response
Although the Rappor-based mechanism of Section 3.1 achieves a significantly improved sample
complexity over the naive learning-and-testing approach, it suffers several shortcomings. The most
apparent is its time complexity: inherently, the one-hot encoding procedure used in Rappor leads
to a time complexity of Θ(kn), with an extra linear dependence on the alphabet size k, which is
far from the “gold standard” of O(n) complexity.
A more time-efficient procedure is obtained using HR. In fact, we describe an algorithm for
testing uniformity based on HR that has the same sample complexity as the one based on Rappor
described above, but is much more time-efficient.
Theorem 11. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 5 based on ε-LDP HR can test whether a distribution is
uniform or γ-far from uniform using
O
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
samples. Moreover, the algorithm runs in time near-linear in the number of samples.
Algorithm 5 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Hadamard Response
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n samples
1: Set
αH ← e
ε − 1
eε + 1
K ← 2⌈log(k+1)⌉
2: Apply the HR (with parameters ε, K) to the n samples to obtain n independent samples in
[K] ⊲ Time O(log k) per user
3: Invoke the testing algorithm Test-ℓ2 of Theorem 13 on these n samples, with parameters
b← 1 + αH√
K
, γ′ ← 2αHγ
kK
and q∗ being the explicit distribution from Theorem 12 ⊲ Time O(n log k + n log n)
4: if Test-ℓ2 accepts then
5: return uniform
6: else
7: return not uniform
8: end if
To describe the intuition behind this algorithm, suppose we feed inputs from an input distri-
bution p ∈ ∆([k]) to the more general mechanism in Section 2.2, whose output then follows some
induced distribution q ∈ ∆([K]). A natural hope is that whenever p is uniform (over [k]), then q
is uniform (over [K]), too; and that conversely if p is not uniform, then q is neither, and that the
distance to uniformity is preserved. This is not exactly what we will obtain. However, we can get
something close to it in the next result, which suffices for our purpose.4
4To see that our desired statement cannot hold as stated above, note that for p = u, (14) implies q(z1) =
1+αH
K
,
since |Dz1 | = k as the first column of HK is the all-one vector. Thus the squared ℓ2 distance of q to uniform is at
least α2H/K.
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Theorem 12. Let ε ∈ (0, 1], K = O(k) be a power of 2, and denote by q the output distribution
over [K]. Then, we have
‖q − q∗‖22 =
α2H
K
· ‖p − u‖22 ≍
ε2
k
‖p− u‖22 , (12)
where αH := e
ε−1
eε+1 , and q
∗ ∈ ∆([K]) is an explicit distribution, efficiently computable and indepen-
dent of p, with ‖q∗‖2 ≤ (1 + αH)/
√
K. Moreover, q∗ can be sampled in time O(logK).
Thus, when p = u, we get q = q∗. Otherwise when dTV(p, u) > γ, then
‖q − q∗‖22 >
4α2Hγ
2
kK
= Θ
(
ε2
k2
γ2
)
. (13)
The observation above suggests that if we can estimate the ℓ2 distance between q and q∗, we can
get our desired uniformity test. We facilitate this by invoking the result below, which follows from
the ℓ2-distance estimation algorithm of [CDVV14, Proposition 3.1], combined with an observation
from [DK16, Lemma 2.3]:5
Theorem 13 (Adapted from [CDVV14, Proposition 3.1]). For two unknown distributions p, q ∈
∆([k]), there exists an algorithm Test-ℓ2 that distinguishes with probability at least 2/3 between
the cases ‖p− q‖2 ≤ γ/2 and ‖p − q‖2 > γ by observing O(min(‖p‖2, ‖q‖2)/γ2) samples from each.
Moreover, this algorithm runs in time near-linear in the number of samples.
We apply the algorithm of Theorem 13 to our case by generating desired number of samples
from q∗, which can simply be obtained by passing samples from the uniform distribution via HR,
and using them along with the samples observed from q at the output of HR. We need to distinguish
between the cases q = q∗ and ‖q − q∗‖2 > γ′/
√
K, which by the previous result can be done using
O(‖q∗‖2K/γ′2) samples where γ′ := 2αHγ/
√
k. Substituting K = O(k) and ‖q∗‖2 = O(1/
√
K),
the number of samples we need is
O

 1√
K
·K ·
(√
k
γε
)2 = O
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
,
which is our claimed sample complexity.
The time complexity follows from the efficiency of Hadamard encoding (see [ASZ18, Section
4.1]), which allows each player to generate their private sample in time O(logK) = O(log k), and to
send only O(log k) bits.6 After this, running the Test-ℓ2 algorithm takes time O(n logK+n log n),
the first term being the time required to generate n samples from q∗. Thus, to conclude the proof
of Theorem 11, it only remains to establish Theorem 12 – which we do next.
Proof of Theorem 12. For any z ∈ [K], let Dz ⊆ [k] be the set of symbols x such that z ∈ Cx.
5[CDVV14] require that b ≥ max(‖p‖2, ‖q‖2); [DK16] shows how to relax this requirement to b ≥ min(‖p‖2, ‖q‖2).
6This is significantly better than the O(k) time and communication per player of Algorithm 4.
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Then, from Eq. (4) (recalling that s = K/2) we get
q(z) =
∑
x∈Dz
W (z | x)p(x) +
∑
x∈Dz
W (z | x)p(x)
=
1
s
(
p(Dz)
eε
eε + 1
+ p(Dcz)
1
eε + 1
)
+
1
K
· e
ε − 1
eε + 1
· (p(Dz)− p(Dcz))
=
1
K
+
αH
K
(2p(Dz)− 1) . (14)
Define q∗ ∈ ∆([K]) as
q∗(z) :=
1
K
+
αH
K
(
2 |Dz|
k
− 1
)
, ∀z ∈ [K], (15)
so that q∗(z) ∈ [(1 − αH)/K, (1 + αH)/K] for every z and ‖q∗‖2 ≤ (1 + αH)/
√
K. From Eqs. (14)
and (15), we get
‖q − q∗‖22 =
∑
z∈[K]
(q(z)− q∗(z))2 = 4α
2
H
K2
∑
z∈[K]
(
p(Dz)− |Dz|
k
)2
. (16)
Note that we may view a probability distribution p ∈ ∆([k]) as a function p : {0, 1}k → R with
p(s) = p(S) =
∑
x∈S
p(x), ∀s ∈ {0, 1}k ,
where we identify s ∈ {0, 1}k with the subset S = { x ∈ [k] : sx = 1 } ⊆ [k] and use the two
notations interchangeably. Also, from Fact 2 and the definition of the Cx as sets encoded by the
rows of the matrix HK , we have that
χφ(x)(z) = (HK)φ(x),z = 21{z∈Cx} − 1, ∀ z ∈ [K], x ∈ [k],
whereby ∑
x∈[k]
(
p(x)− 1
k
)
χφ(x)(z) = 2
(
p(Dz)− |Dz|
k
)
, ∀ z ∈ [K].
Now, consider the function g : [K]→ R defined by g(z) = 2 (p(Dz)− |Dz| /k),7. Using the previous
equation, we can view g alternatively as
g(z) =
∑
T∈φ([k])
(
p(φ−1(T ))− 1
k
)
χT (z), ∀ z ∈ [K].
Therefore,
gˆ(T ) =
∑
x∈[k]
(p(x)− 1/k)1{T=φ(x)}, ∀T ∈ [K],
which by Parseval’s theorem (Theorem 3) gives
4
K
∑
z∈[K]
(
p(Dz)− |Dz|
k
)2
= ‖g‖2 =
∑
T∈[K]
gˆ(T )2 =
∑
x∈[k]
(
p(x)− 1
k
)2
= ‖p − u‖22 .
The identity above, together with (16), yields
‖q − q∗‖22 =
α2H
K
‖p− u‖22 .
The claimed result then follows from the fact that αH = ε2 + o(ε).
7Recall that K is a power of two, so [K] can be identified to {0, 1}logK .
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4 Optimal Locally Private Uniformity Testing
In the foregoing treatment, we saw that existing (private-coin) mechanisms such as Rappor and HR
can perform uniformity testing using O(k3/2/(γ2ε2)) samples at best. In this section, we describe
our public-coin mechanism, Raptor,8 and use it to design an algorithm for testing uniformity that
requires only O(k/(γ2ε2)) samples and constant communication9 per sample.
Our algorithm builds upon the warmup algorithm of Lemma 5, which allows us to perform
uniformity testing for k = 2 using O(1/(γ2ε2)) samples. Specifically, we use public randomness to
reduce the uniformity testing problem for an arbitrary k to that for k = 2, albeit with γ replaced
with γ/
√
k; and then apply the warmup algorithm.
To enable the aforementioned reduction, we need to show that the probabilities of a randomly
generated set differ appropriately under the uniform distribution and a distribution that is γ far
from uniform in total variation distance. To accomplish this, we prove a more general result which
might be of independent interest. We say that random variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xk are 4-symmetric
if E[Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4 ] depends only on the number of times each element appears in the multiset
{i1, i2, i3, i4}.10 The following result constitutes a concentration bound for Z =
∑
i∈[k] δiXi for a
probability perturbation δ.
Theorem 14 (Probability perturbation concentration). Consider a vector δ such that
∑
i∈[k] δi = 0.
Let random variables X1, . . . ,Xk be 4-symmetric and Z =
∑
i∈[k] δiXi. Then, for every α ∈ (0, 1/4),
Pr
[(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)
−
√
38α
1− 2αE
[
X41
] ≤ Z2‖δ‖22 ≤
1
1− 2α
(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)]
≥ α.
The proof requires a careful evaluation of the second and the fourth moments of Z and is deferred
to Appendix A. As a corollary, we obtain the result below, which is at the core of our reduction
argument.
Corollary 15. Consider a distribution p ∈ ∆([k]) such that dTV(p, u) > γ. For a random subset
S of [k] distributed uniformly over all subsets of [k] of cardinality k/2, it holds that
Pr
[ ∣∣∣∣p(S)− 12
∣∣∣∣ > γ√5k
]
>
1
477
.
Proof. Let Y1, . . . , Yk be independent random bits, and let X1, . . . ,Xk be obtained by conditioning
(Y1, . . . , Yk) on the event
∑
i∈[k]Xi = k/2. Consider the random set S defined as
S = { i ∈ [k] : Xi = 1 } .
Letting δ := p− u, we have
p(S)− u(S) = p(S)− 1
2
=
∑
i∈[k]
δiXi.
8Which stands for Randomized Aggregated Private Testing Optimal Response.
9In fact, we only need 1-bit per sample if we allow asymmetric implementation.
10That is, if E[Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4 ] does not depend on the actual values of i1, i2, i3, i4 (for which there are k
4 possibilities)
but only on the quantities 1{ia=ib}, for 1 ≤ a < b ≤ 4 (for which there are 2
(4
2
) possibilities).
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Note that E
[
X21
]
= E
[
X41
]
= 1/2. Also,
E[X1X2] =
1
2
Pr[X2 = 1 | X1 = 1 ]
=
1
2
Pr
[
Y2 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣ Y1 = 1,
k∑
i=1
Yi =
k
2
]
=
1
2
Pr
[
Y2 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=2
Yi =
(
k
2
− 1
)]
=
1
2
E
[
Y2
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=2
Yi =
(
k
2
− 1
)]
which by symmetry yields
E[X1X2] =
1
2
E
[
Yj
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=2
Yi =
(
k
2
− 1
)]
, ∀ 2 ≤ j ≤ k.
Taking the average of the right-side, we get
E[X1X2] =
1
2(k − 1)E

 k∑
j=2
Yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=2
Yi =
(
k
2
− 1
) = (k − 2)
4(k − 1) ≤
1
4
.
Finally, note that
‖δ‖22 ≥
1
k
‖δ‖21 ≥
4γ2
k
,
so that, applying Theorem 14 to Z =
∑k
i=1 δiXi with α := 1/477 we get
Pr
[
Z2 >
γ2
5k
]
≥ 1
477
,
which completes the proof.
Armed with this result, we can divide our LDP testing problem into two parts: A public-coin
ε-LDP mechanism releases 1-bit per sample to the curator, and the curator applies a test to the
received bits to accomplish uniformity testing. This specific mechanism suggested by the previous
corollary is our Raptor (see Section 1.1 for a description). While in this paper we have only
considered its use for testing uniformity and independence, since it provides locally private 1-bit
outputs that, in essence, preserve the ℓ2 distance of the underlying distribution from any other
fixed one, we can foresee many other use-cases for Raptor and pose it as a standalone mechanism
of independent interest.
Recall that in Raptor the curator and the users pick a random subset S of size k/2 from
their shared randomness, and each user sends the indicator function that its input lies in this set
S using ε-LDP RR. This is precisely the 1-bit information from samples required to enable the
estimator of Lemma 5. Note that when the underlying distribution p is uniform, the probability
p(S) of user bit being 1 is exactly 1/2. Also, by Corollary 15 when p is γ-far from uniform we
have p(S) = 1/2 ± Ω(γ/√k) with a constant probability (over the choice of S); by repeating the
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protocol a constant number of times,11 we can ensure that with high constant probability at least
one of the choices of S will indeed have this property. Therefore, we obtain an instance of the
uniformity testing problem for k = 2, namely the problem of privately distinguishing a Bern(1/2)
from Bern
(
1/2± c1γ√
k
)
. Thus, when we apply Raptor to the samples, the curator gets the 1-bit
updates required by Lemma 5 to which it can apply the estimator prescribed in Lemma 5 to solve
the underlying uniformity testing instance for k = 2 using
O
(
k
γ2
(eε + 1)2
(eε − 1)2
)
samples. Since we used ε-LDP RR to send each bit, Raptor, too, is ε-LDP and thereby so is our
overall uniformity test.
We summarize the overall algorithm and its performance below.
Theorem 16. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 6 based on ε-LDP Raptor can test whether a distribution
is uniform or γ-far from uniform using
O
(
k
γ2ε2
)
samples.
Algorithm 6 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Raptor
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n = mT samples
1: Set
c← 1
477
δ ← c
2(1 + c)
, γ′ ← γ√
5k
, T = Θ(1)
2: for t from 1 to T do ⊲ In parallel
3: Generate uniformly at random a subset St of [k] of cardinality k/2
4: Apply Raptor using St to each sample in the mini-batch of m samples
5: Use the estimator in the proof of Lemma 5 to test with probability of failure δ
if p(St) = 1/2 (unbiased) or |p(St)− 1/2| > γ′ (biased)
6: end for
7: Let τ denote the fraction of the T outcomes that returned unbiased
8: if τ > 1− (δ + c4) then
9: return uniform
10: else
11: return not uniform
12: end if
Proof of Theorem 16. The proof of correctness follows the foregoing outline, which we describe
in more detail. Let c := 1/477 be the constant from Corollary 15, and let δ := c2(1+c) , and set
γ′ := γ√
5k
. By a standard amplification argument,12 one can amplify the success probability of
11To preserve the symmetry of our mechanism, we note that this can be done “in parallel” at each user. That
is, each user considers the same T = Θ(1) many random subsets, and sends their corresponding T privatized (with
parameter ε′ = ε/T ) indicator bits to the curator.
12Namely, letting the server divide the received samples into O(log(1/δ)) disjoint batches, and running the private
estimation procedure of Lemma 5 independently T times, before outputting the majority vote.
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the private estimation procedure of Lemma 5 to 1 − δ, using a total of O(log(1/δ)/(γ′2ε2)) =
O(1/(γ′2ε2)) samples (to achieve privacy ε and accuracy γ′).
Consider the t-th test from Algorithm 6 (where 1 ≤ t ≤ T ), and let bt be the indicator that
the bias estimation outputs unbiased. If p is uniform, then by the above we have Pr[ bt = 1 ] ≥
1 − δ (where the probability is over the choice of the random subset St, and the randomness of
the bias estimation). However, if p is γ-far from uniform, by Corollary 15 it it the case that
Pr[ bt = 1 ] ≤ (1− c) + cδ = 1− (δ + c2). Therefore, for a sufficiently large constant in the choice of
T = Θ(1/c2) = Θ(1), a Chernoff bound argument ensures that we can distinguish between these
two cases with probability at least 2/3.
5 Proofs of Optimality: Lower Bounds for Uniformity Testing
We now establish that the public-coin testing algorithm in the previous section has optimal sample-
complexity for any LDP uniformity testing algorithm. Furthermore, we establish lower bounds on
the sample complexity for any LDP testing algorithm using Rappor or HR, showing that the tests
we proposed using these mechanisms are sample optimal (up to constant factors) in their class.
5.1 Lower bound for public-coin mechanisms
We first show that any uniformity testing algorithm that uses data from an ε-LDP public-coin
mechanism (which includes private-coin mechanisms) requires at least Ω
(
k/(γ2ε2)
)
samples.
Theorem 17. For ε ∈ (0, 1], any ε-LDP public-coin mechanism for uniformity testing must use
Ω
(
k
γ2ε2
)
samples.
Proof. Our lower bound relies on analyzing the standard “Paninski construction” [Pan08], which
we briefly recall. Assuming without loss of generality that k is even, we partition the domain in
k/2 consecutive pairs (2i − 1, 2i). For a given parameter γ ∈ (0, 1/2], the family of “no-instances”
is the collection of 2k/2 distributions (pθ)θ∈{−1,+1}k/2 where
pθ(2i − 1) = 1 + 2θiγ
k
, pθ(2i) =
1− 2θiγ
k
, i ∈ [k/2] .
Note that every such pθ is a total variation exactly γ from the uniform distribution on [k].
Our starting point will be the proof of the public-coin lower bound of [ACT18, Theorem 6.1] for
uniformity testing in a (non-private) distributed setting. Note that the proof in [ACT18] proceeds
by noting that once we restrict our attention to the hypothesis testing problem implied by Paninski’s
construction, we can derandomize and find a deterministic protocol that outperforms the public-
coin protocol. Therefore, it suffices to bound the performance of deterministic protocols. However,
in our current application, relaxing to deterministic protocols will get rid of local privacy constraints
and will not lead to useful bounds. Instead, we note in similar vein as the proof in [ACT18] that
we can derandomize public randomness and find a private-coin ε-LDP protocol that achieves the
same performance for Paninski’s construction as the public-coin protocol we start with. Therefore,
it suffices to restrict our attention to private-coin protocols.
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Let W be an arbitrary ε-LDP private-coin mechanism for uniformity testing. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n
and θ, θ′ ∈ {−1,+1}k/2, define Hj(θ, θ′) as
Hj(θ, θ′) :=
γ2
k
∑
m
∑
i1,i2∈[k/2]
θi1θ
′
i2
(Wj(m | 2i1 − 1)−Wj(m | 2i1)) (Wj(m | 2i2 − 1)−Wj(m | 2i2))∑k
i=1Wj(m | i)
.
where m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n denotes the tuple of outputs from the n users. Let
W¯j(m) :=
1
k
k∑
i=1
Wj(m | i)
i.e., W¯j(m) is the probability of user j outputting m when the input distribution is uniform. Let
δmi,j be such that
Wj(m | 2i− 1)−Wj(m | 2i) = W¯j(m)δmi,j .
Then by the conditions for LDP, we must have∣∣∣δmi,j ∣∣∣ ≤ eε − 1 .
Furthermore, we can rewrite
Hj(θ, θ′) =
γ2
k2
∑
m
∑
i1,i2∈[k/2]
θi1θ
′
i2W¯j(m)δ
m
i1,jδ
m
i2,j =
∑
i1,i2∈[k/2]
θi1θ
′
i2
(
γ2
k2
∑
m
W¯j(m)δmi1,jδ
m
i2,j
)
=
γ2
k2
θTHjθ
′,
where Hj is an [k/2] × [k/2] matrix with (i1, i2)th entry equal to
Hj(i1, i2) :=
∑
m
W¯j(m)δmi1,jδ
m
i2,j .
By using that
∑
m W¯j(m) = 1, we further get that
|Hj(i1, i2)| ≤ (eε − 1)2 .
For a given distribution p ∈ ∆([k]), denote by W(p) ∈ ∆(({0, 1}∗)n) the product distribution over
m (the tuple of n messages) when each user gets an independent sample from p. In [ACT18],
it is shown that, with n users, the χ2 distance between the distributions of (i) the output of
the mechanism under the Paninski mixture, Wno := 1
2k/2
∑
θW(pθ), and (ii) the output of the
mechanism under the uniform distribution Wyes :=W(u), is bounded by
Eθ,θ′

exp

 n∑
j=1
Hj(θ, θ′)



− 1 = Eθ,θ′

exp

γ2
k2
θT (
n∑
j=1
Hj)θ′



− 1 .
We will also rely on the following technical claim:
Claim 18 ([ACT18, Claim 6.10]). Consider random vectors θ, θ′ ∈ {−1, 1}k/2 with each θi and
θ′i distributed uniformly over {−1, 1}, independent of each other and independent for different i’s.
Then, for any symmetric matrix H,
lnEθθ′e
λθTHθ′ ≤ λ2‖H‖2F , ∀λ > 0 .
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Using this claim, and choosing λ := γ
2
k2 we obtain the following upper bound on the distance
between the distributions of the output of the mechanisms in the two cases:
dTV(Wno,Wyes) ≤ exp

γ4
k4
‖
n∑
j=1
Hj‖2F

− 1 ≤ exp

γ4
k4
n

 n∑
j=1
‖Hj‖2F



− 1
≤ exp
(
γ4n2
k4
(
(k/2)2 (eε − 1)4
))
− 1 ≤ exp
(
γ4n2
4k2
(eε − 1)4
)
− 1 .
This implies the claimed lower bound by a standard application of Le Cam’s two-point method (as
e.g. detailed by Pollard [Pol03]), as one must have n = Ω(k/(ε2γ2)) for the RHS to be Ω(1).
5.2 Lower bound for Rappor
In this section, we prove a lower bound for any uniformity testing mechanism that uses Rappor,
not only the algorithm from Section 3.1 (Theorem 8). In fact, the next result shows that that
algorithm requires the least number of samples (up to constant factors) among all mechanisms
based on the output Rappor, even those allowing public-coin protocols in their post-processing
stage.
Theorem 19. In the high-privacy regime, any ε-LDP mechanism for uniformity testing that uses
Rappor for reporting user data must use
Ω
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
samples.
Proof. We once again take recourse to Pollard’s recipe and proceed as in the proof of Theorem 17.
Denote by W : [k] → {0, 1}k the channel from the input to the output of Rappor. Letting for
conciseness qε := eε/(1 + eε), we first observe that for any observation i ∈ [k] one has
W (m | i) = (miqε + (1−mi)(1− qε)) · q|{ ℓ : ℓ 6=i,mℓ=0 }|ε (1− qε)|{ ℓ : ℓ 6=i,mℓ=1 }|
= miqm(0)+1ε (1− qε)m(1)−1 + (1−mi)qm(0)−1ε (1− qε)m(1)+1,
where m(0) and m(1), respectively, denote the number of 0’s and 1’s in m. As was seen in the
previous proof of lower bound, for our purpose, we need to evaluate
∑
i∈[k]W (m | i) and W (m |
i)−W (m | i′). For the former quantity, we have
∑
i∈[k]
W (m | i) = qm(0)ε (1− qε)m(1)
(
m(1)
qε
1− qε +m(0)
1− qε
qε
)
.
For the latter, we have
W (m | i)−W (m | i′) = qm(0)ε (1− qε)m(1)(mi −mi′)
(
qε
1− qε −
1− qε
qε
)
.
We are now in a position to prove the lower bound. We are considering protocols where each sample
Xj is reported to the center using Rappor, and so, each sample is reported using the same channel
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W described above. Therefore, the k× k matrix Hj used in the previous proof does not depend on
j and satisfies
H(i1, i2) := Hj(i1, i2) = k
∑
m
(W (m|2i1 − 1)−W (m|2i1)) (W (m|2i2 − 1)−W (m|2i2))∑k
i=1W (m | i)
.
It follows that
H(i1, i2) = k · (e
2ε − 1)2
eε
·
∑
m
qm(0)ε (1− qε)m(1) ·
(m2i1−1 −m2i1)(m2i2−1 −m2i2)
m(1)e2ε +m(0)
.
The key observation that facilitates our bound is that for i1 6= i2, the sum on the right-side is 0.
Indeed, consider the set of messages of fixed type, namely those with m(0) and m(1) fixed. Note
that in any such set, only messages with m2i1 6= m2i1−1 and m2i2 6= m2i2−1 contribute to the sum.
Furthermore, for any fixed m2i2 6= m2i2−1, the contributions corresponding to m2i1 = 1,m2i1−1 = 0
and m2i1 = 0,m2i1−1 = 1 negate each other when i1 6= i2, whereby the overall sum is 0. Thus, we
have
H(i1, i2) = 1{i1=i2}
k(e2ε − 1)2
eε
·
∑
m
qm(0)ε (1− qε)m(1) ·
|m2i1−1 −m2i1 |2
m(1)e2ε +m(0)
≤ 1{i1=i2}
(e2ε − 1)2
eε
·
∑
m
qm(0)ε (1− qε)m(1)
= 1{i1=i2}
(e2ε − 1)2
eε
,
where the inequality holds since m(1)e2ε +m(0) ≥ k for every ε ≥ 0. It follows that
‖H‖2F ≤ k ·
(e2ε − 1)4
e2ε
,
whereby
dTV(Wno,Wyes) ≤ exp
(
γ4n2
k4
‖H‖2F
)
− 1 ≤ exp
(
γ4n2
k4
(
k
(e2ε − 1)4
e2ε
))
− 1
≤ exp
(
γ4n2
e2εk3
(
e2ε − 1
)4)− 1,
which can only be Ω(1) if n = Ω
(
k3/2
γ2(eε−1)2
)
, establishing the result.
5.3 Lower bound for Hadamard Response
Finally, we establish the analogue of Theorem 19 for any mechanism based on Hadamard Response.
Theorem 20. In the high-privacy regime, any ε-LDP mechanism for uniformity testing that uses
HR for reporting user data must use
Ω
(
k3/2
γ2ε2
)
samples.
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Proof. The proof follows the same outline as the proof of Theorem 19 – we show once again that the
matrixH corresponding to using HR for reporting each users data is a diagonal matrix. Specifically,
considering the set of messages as {0, . . . ,K − 1} and the inputs as {0, . . . k − 1} for convenience,
the matrix H in the proof of lower bound is given by
H(i1, i2) = k
K−1∑
m=0
(W (m | 2i1)−W (m | 2i1 + 1)) (W (m | 2i2)−W (m | 2i2 + 1))∑k−1
i=0 W (m | i)
, 0 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ k − 12 ,
where W (m | i) denotes the probability that HR outputs m when the input is i and is given by
W (m | i) = 2
K(eε + 1)
(
eε1{m∈Ci} + 1{m/∈Ci}
)
=
2
K(eε + 1)
(
(eε − 1)1{m∈Ci} + 1
)
.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use m and i interchangeably to denote their values and the
binary vectors corresponding to binary representation of those values. Further, let 〈x, y〉 = ⊕xiyi
denote the standard (parity) inner product for vectors over F2. With this convention, for HR we
have
1{m∈Ci} = 1{〈m,i〉=0}.
Note that for m = 0 and every i, 1{m∈Ci} = 1, which implies that W (0 | i) is the same for all i. It
follows that the term corresponding to m = 0 in the expression for H(i1, i2) is 0. Moreover, using∑k−1
i=0 1{〈m,i〉=0} = K/2 for m 6= 0, we obtain
k∑
i=1
W (m | i) = 2
K(eε + 1)
((
eε − 1
) k−1∑
i=0
1{〈m,i〉=0} + k
)
=
2
K(eε + 1)
((
eε − 1
)K
2
+ k
)
= c(ε, k,K) · k
K
,
where c(ε, k,K) = 2((eε − 1)K/2 + k)/(k(eε +1)); by assumption, k ≤ K ≤ 2k, which implies that
c(ε, k,K) ∈ [1, 2]. Therefore, for every 0 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ (k − 1)/2,
H(i1, i2) = c(ε, k,K) · 4(e
ε − 1)2
K(eε + 1)2
K−1∑
m=1
(
1{〈m,2i1〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i1+1〉=0}
)
·
(
1{〈m,2i2〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i2+1〉=0}
)
. (17)
We claim that H(i1, i2) = 0 for i1 6= i2. Indeed, a case analysis yields(
1{〈m,2i1〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i1+1〉=0}
) (
1{〈m,2i2〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i2+1〉=0}
)
=
(
1{〈m,2i1〉=〈m,2i2〉} − 1{〈m,2i1〉6=〈m,2i2〉}
)
1{〈m,1〉6=0} ,
where the condition 1{〈m,1〉6=0} indicates that the expression is nonzero only when m is odd. Thus,
the summands in (17) can be restricted to odd m, and further, each summand equals
1{〈m,2i1〉=〈m,2i2〉} − 1{〈m,2i1〉6=〈m,2i2〉} = 1{〈m,2(i1⊕i2)〉=0} − 1{〈m,2(i1⊕i2)〉=1} .
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We can simplify the expression on the right-side by noting that each odd m has the binary form
(b, 1) and 〈(b, 1), 2i〉 = 〈b, i〉. Hence,
K−1∑
m=1
(
1{〈m,2i1〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i1+1〉=0}
) (
1{〈m,2i2〉=0} − 1{〈m,2i2+1〉=0}
)
=
(K−1)/2∑
m=0
(
1{〈m,(i1⊕i2)〉=0} − 1{〈m,(i1⊕i2)〉=1}
)
=
K − 1
2
1{i1=i2}.
since for any nonzero vector j, | { m : 〈m, j〉〉 = 0 } | = | { m : 〈m, j〉〉 = 1 } | . In summary, we
have
H(i1, i2) = c(ε, k,K) · 4(e
ε − 1)2(K − 1)
K(eε + 1)2
1{i1=i2},
whereby using c(ε, k,K) ∈ [1, 2] we get
‖H‖2F =
∑
i1,i2
|H(i1, i2)|2 = O
(
k
(eε − 1)4
(eε + 1)4
)
.
The proof is completed in the same manner as the proof of Theorem 19.
6 Independence Testing
In this section, we treat independence testing. We begin in Section 6.1 with an independence
testing mechanism based on HR that does not require public randomness and which achieves
significantly improved sample complexity over the state-of-the-art (in dependence on the alphabet
size). However, we do not have matching lower bounds for its performance.
Then, in Section 6.2, we describe and analyze an optimal procedure that uses public randomness,
akin to the optimal uniformity testing mechanism of Section 4.
6.1 A mechanism based on Hadamard Response and private χ2 learning
We present a symmetric, private-coin LDP mechanism for testing independence of distributions
over [k]× [k] (although, as we note in Remark 1, our mechanism can be easily extended to handle
a more general setting).
Theorem 21. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 7 based on a symmetric private-coin ε-LDP mechanism
can test whether a distribution over [k]× [k] is a product distribution or γ-far from product using
O
(
k3
γ2ε4
)
samples.
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The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 21. The argument will follow
the “testing-by-hybrid-learning” approach of [ADK15], modified suitably for the local differential
privacy setting. Specifically, instead of learning and testing the underlying user data distributions,
we simply do this in the Fourier domain for the distributions seen at the output of HR; details
follow.
Denote by H the HR mapping from [k] to [K], where K = O(k), and αH := eε−1eε+1 as
in Section 3.2. For any probability distribution p ∈ ∆([k] × [k]), we define T (p) ∈ ∆([K]× [K]) as
the distribution of (Z1, Z2) obtained by the process below:
(1) Draw (X1,X2) from p;
(2) apply HR independently to X1 and X2 to obtain Z1 and Z2.
It is immediate to see that if p is a product distribution with marginals p1 and p2, then
T (p) = H(p1)⊗H(p2) .
We build our test on observations (Z1, Z2) from each user, with distribution T (p). Our proposed
test uses these samples. It builds on several components that we will describe later; for ease of
presentation, we summarize the overall algorithm in Algorithm 7. For Section 6.1, we rely on a
Algorithm 7 Locally Private Independence Testing
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1)
1: Set
αH ← e
ε − 1
eε + 1
, K ← 2⌈log(k+1)⌉
2: Each of the n = 2n1 + n2 users, given their data (X1,X2), applies HR independently to X1
and X2 and sends the outcomes to the curator
3: Use the first 2n1 samples from T (p) to obtain n1 samples from T (p1 ⊗ p2)
4: Apply the algorithm of Corollary 27 to the n1 = O(k3/α4Hγ
2) samples from T (p1⊗p2) obtained
in the previous step to learn a distribution q ∈ ∆([K]× [K]) such that minz q(z) ≥ 1/(50K2)
and, with probability at least 4/5,
χ2(T (p1 ⊗ p2), q) ≤ α4Hγ2/k2
5: Apply the algorithm of Theorem 22 to the remaining n2 = O(
√
K2/γ′2) = O(k3/(α4Hγ
2))
samples from T (p) to distinguish, with probability at least 9/10, between
χ2(T (p), q) ≤ γ′2/2, and χ2(T (p), q) > γ′2
where γ′2 := 2α4Hγ
2/k2.
6: if χ2(T (p), Q) ≤ γ′2/2 then
7: return independent
8: else
9: return not independent
10: end if
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result of [ADK15], modified slightly for our purposes:13
Theorem 22 ([ADK15, Theorem 1]). Given the explicit description of a distribution q ∈ ∆([k])
such that minx∈[k] q(x) ≥ 150k and samples from an unknown distribution p ∈ ∆([k]), there exists
an efficient algorithm with that can distinguish with probability at least 9/10 between the cases
χ2(p, q) < γ
2
2 and χ
2(p, q) ≥ γ2 using O(√k/γ2) samples.
In addition to Theorem 22, our proposed algorithm builds on Corollary 27 which we will describe
and prove below. But before we prove this result, we note that this algorithm can be seen to satisfy
all the properties claimed in Theorem 21. Indeed, it requiresO(k3/(α4Hγ
2)); its privacy is immediate
since the observations at the curator are obtained by passing user data via HR. The mechanism is
clearly symmetric, as each user sends the output of HR (applied independently to both marginal
of their data) to the curator – it is only at the curator that these privatized outputs are used and
combined to generate samples from T (p), T (p1 ⊗ p2), T (p1), or T (p2).
As for the correctness, it will follow from Corollary 27 and Theorem 22 (ensuring that the
algorithm is overall correct with probability at least 7/10 > 2/3), once the following structural
property is established: For p that is γ-far from any product distribution has χ2(T (p), q) > γ′2.
Formally, we show the following:
Theorem 23. Let p ∈ ∆([k]× [k]) with marginals p1, p2 ∈ ∆([k]), and q ∈ ∆([k]× [k]) be a
product distribution such that χ2(T (p1 ⊗ p2),T (q)) ≤ α
4
Hγ
2
k2
. (i) If p is a product distribution, then
χ2(T (p),T (q)) ≤ α4Hγ2k2 . (ii) if p is γ-far from being a product distribution, then χ2(T (p),T (q)) >
2α4Hγ
2
k2 .
It only remains to establish the structural property above and χ2 learning algorithm Corollary 27.
Proof of structural result Theorem 23. We prove that (i) if p is independent, then χ2(T (p1⊗
p2), q) will be small, while (ii) if p is far from independent then χ2(T (p1⊗p2), q) must be noticeably
larger. The key technical component is the next lemma.
Lemma 24. Let p, q ∈ ∆([k] × [k]) be two distributions, with marginals p1, p2 and q1, q2, respec-
tively. Then,
‖T (p)− T (q)‖22 =
α4H
K2
‖p − q‖22 +
α2H
K2
(
‖p1 − q1‖22 + ‖p2 − q2‖22
)
.
In particular, if dTV(p, q) > γ, then ‖T (p)− T (q)‖2 >
2α2Hγ
Kk .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 12. Note that it follows in the manner of (14) that
13This statement differs slightly from that in [ADK15], but can be seen to follow from their analysis. Indeed,
the difference only impacts the analysis of the variance of their estimator, which now goes through because of our
assumption on minx∈[k] q(x).
30
for every (z1, z2) ∈ [K]× [K],
T (p)(z1, z2)
=
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
W (z1 | x1)W (z2 | x2)p(x1, x2)
=
4
K2(eε + 1)2
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
p(x1, x2)
(
(eε − 1)1{z1∈Cx1} + 1
) (
(eε − 1)1{z2∈Cx2} + 1
)
=
1
K2
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
p(x1, x2)
(
αHχφ(x1)(z1) + 1
) (
αHχφ(x2)(z2) + 1
)
=
α2H
K2
∑
x1,x2
p(x1, x2)χφ(x1)(z1)χφ(x2)(z2) +
αH
K2
(∑
x1
p1(x1)χφ(x1)(z1) +
∑
x2
p2(x2)χφ(x2)(z2)
)
+
1
K2
,
where by the second-to-last identity above gives T (p)(z1, z2) ∈ [1 − α2H , 1 + α2H ] · 1K2 for every
(z1, z2). As an analogous expression holds for T (q)(z1, z2), setting g := T (p)− T (q) we have
g(z1, z2) =
α2H
K2
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
(p(x1, x2)− p1(x1)p2(x2))χφ(x1)(z1)χφ(x2)(z2)
+
αH
K2
( ∑
x1∈[k]
(p1(x1)− q1(x1))χφ(x1)(z1) +
∑
x2∈[k]
(p2(x2)− q2(x2))χφ(x2)(z2)
)
,
for every (z1, z2) ∈ [K]× [K]. Now, as in Theorem 12, but looking at the corresponding characters
for the Hadamard transform from [k] × [k] to [K]× [K],14 we get
gˆ(T ) =
α2H
K2
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
(p(x1, x2)− p1(x1)p2(x2))1{T=(φ(x1),φ(x2))}
+
αH
K2
( ∑
x1∈[k]
(p1(x1)− q1(x1))1{T=φ(x1)} +
∑
x2∈[k]
(p2(x2)− q2(x2))1{T=φ(x2)}
)
.
By Parseval’s theorem (Theorem 3),
‖g‖2 = 1
K2
∑
(z1,z2)∈[K]×[K]
(T (p)(z1, z2)− T (q)(z1, z2))2
=
∑
T∈[K]×[K]
gˆ(T )2
=
α4H
K4
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
(p(x1, x2)− q(x1, x2))2
+
α2H
K4
(∑
x1
(p1(x1)− q1(x1))2 +
∑
x2
(p2(x2)− q2(x2))2
)
,
14There are (K + 1)2 characters for [K]× [K] of the form χT (z1)χS(z2), χT (z1), and χT (z2) for S, T ⊆ [K], along
with the constant character. Note that the constant character will not appear in the proof of Lemma 24, as we
consider the transform of the difference of two functions, canceling the constant term.
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so that
‖T (p)− T (q)‖22 =
α4H
K2
‖p− q‖22 +
α2H
K2
(
‖p1 − q1‖22 + ‖p2 − q2‖22
)
≥ α
4
H
K2
‖p− q‖22 ,
as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 23. The first statement is obvious, as then T (p) = T (p1 ⊗ p2). Turning to the
second, assume that p is γ-far from being a product distribution, so that in particular dTV(p, q) > γ.
This implies by Lemma 24 that ‖T (p)− T (q)‖22 > (4α4Hγ2)/(K2k2) which along with ‖T (q)‖∞ ≤
1+α2H
K2
≤ 2
K2
yields
χ2(T (p),T (q)) =
∑
z∈[K]×[K]
(T (p)(z) − T (q)(z))2
T (q)(z) ≥
K2
2
‖T (p)− T (q)‖22 >
2α4Hγ
2
k2
,
as claimed.
Learning in χ2 distance in the Hadamard domain. Next, we establish the correctness
of Step 4. That is, we show that by leveraging the product structure one can (privately) learn
T (p1⊗ p2) to the desired χ2 accuracy with the number of samples scaling as k3. To do so, will rely
on the following result in [KOPS15] on learning in χ2 distance:
Lemma 25 ([KOPS15, Lemma 4]). The Laplace (add-1) estimator can learn k-ary distributions
to χ2 distance γ2, with probability 9/10, using O(k/γ2) samples.
The next corollary ensues.
Corollary 26. There is an efficient estimator to learn product distributions over [k] × [k] to χ2
distance γ2, with probability 4/5, using O(k/γ2) samples.
Proof. Let p = p1 ⊗ p2 ∈ ∆([k] × [k]) be a product distribution, and p˜1, p˜2 be the hypotheses
obtained by using the estimator of Lemma 25 independently on the two marginals of p, with distance
parameter γ2/3. We claim that p˜ := p˜1 ⊗ p˜2 can serve as our desired estimate. Indeed, by a union
bound, with probability at least 4/5 it is the case that χ2(p1, p˜1) ≤ γ2/3 and χ2(p2, p˜2) ≤ γ2/3.
When this happens,
χ2(p, p˜) = −1 +
∑
(x1,x2)∈[k]×[k]
p1(x1)2p2(x2)2
p˜1(x1)p˜2(x2)
= −1 +
∑
x1∈[k]
p1(x1)2
p˜1(x1)
∑
x2∈[k]
p2(x2)2
p˜2(x2)
= −1 + (χ2(p1, p˜1) + 1)(χ2(p2, p˜2) + 1)
= χ2(p1, p˜1)χ2(p2, p˜2) + χ2(p1, p˜1) + χ2(p2, p˜2)
≤ γ
4
9
+
2
3
γ2 < γ2,
concluding the proof.
As a further corollary, we finally obtain the desired algorithm for LDP χ2-learning.
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Corollary 27. There exists an algorithm based on a private-coin, symmetric ε-LDP mechanism
that learns T (p1 ⊗ p2) to χ2 distance γ′2 := α4Hγ2/k2, with probability 4/5, using O(k3/(α4Hγ2))
samples. Moreover, the estimate q ∈ ∆([K]× [K]) obtained by this algorithm is a product distribu-
tion with minz∈[K]×[K] q(z) ≥ 1/(50K2).
The last point follows from the fact that T (p1 ⊗ p2)(z) ≥ 1/(2K2) for every z ∈ [K]× [K]. Hence,
if q(z) < 1/(50K2) for some z, then χ2(T (p1 ⊗ p2), q)≫ 1.
Remark 1. To conclude this section, we note that a straightforward generalization of Algorithm 7,
Corollary 27, and Theorems 22 and 23 to the case [k1] × [k2] leads to a symmetric private-coin
ε-LDP mechanism to test whether a distribution over [k1]× [k2] is a product distribution vs. γ-far
from product with sample complexity O
(
(k1k2)(k1 + k2 +
√
k1k2)/(γ2ε4)
)
.
6.2 Optimal independence testing using public-coin mechanisms
We proceed, as for uniformity testing, by reducing independence testing for arbitrary k to that for
k = 2; an algorithm for solving the latter problem is given as a warmup in Corollary 6. We show
that if dTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2) ≥ γ, uniformly random sets S1, S2 ⊆ [k] of cardinality k/2 satisfy
|p(S1, S2)− p1(S1)p2(S2)| = Ω(γ/k), (18)
with constant probability. Therefore, we can perform our independence test by repeating the mech-
anism of Corollary 6 O(1) times, each for independently generated S1, S2 applied to O(k2/(γ2ε2))
samples. Indeed, the claim above guarantees that, with high constant probability, when dTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2) ≥
γ, one of the O(1) repetitions will produce sets S1, S2 that satisfy (18). On the other hand, clearly
when p = p1 ⊗ p2, we have p(S1 × S2) = p1(S1)p2(S2) for all S1, S2 ⊆ [k]. Thus, the mechanism
described in Corollary 6 will allow us to perform independence testing using O(k2/(γ2ε2)) samples
by obtaining first the estimates p˜, p˜1, and p˜2, respectively, of p(S1 × S2), p1(S1), and p2(S2), and
then comparing |p˜− p˜1p˜2| with a suitable threshold.15
Hence, we can (as we did for uniformity testing) divide the LDP testing problem into two
parts: A public-coin ε-LDP mechanism releases 3 bits per sample to the curator, and then the
curator applies a test to the received bits to perform independence testing on the reduced domain
{0, 1} × {0, 1}. The specific mechanism underlying the first part will be Raptor (specifically,
a bivariate variant of Raptor given in Algorithm 8); the second part relies on the estimator
of Corollary 6. As in Section 4, we can boost the probability of success to 2/3 by performing the
above two-part test a constant number of times and using the median trick.
15As was the case for our uniformity testing algorithm, to preserve the symmetry of our mechanism we can ask
that these O(1) repetitions be done “in parallel” at each user; further, for each of these repetitions every user sends
three privatized bits to the central server, corresponding to the indicators of S1 × [k], [k]× S2, and S1 × S2.
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Algorithm 8 The Raptor mechanism, bivariate version
1: The curator and the users sample two independent and uniformly random subsets S1, S2 of [k]
of cardinality k/2.
2: Each user computes the three bit indicators
B1,i = 1{X1,i∈S1}, B2,i = 1{X2,i∈S1}, Bi = 1{(X1,i,X2,i)∈S1×S2}
and sends them using RR, i.e., flips each of them independently with probability 1/(1 + eε/3)
and sends the outcome to the curator. ⊲ Parameter ε/3 to obtain ε-LDP of the joint 3 bits.
It only remains to prove the claim (18). This requires the following (somewhat technical)
extension of Theorem 14; for simplicity, we provide a less general version that addresses only a
specific choice of random variables X and Y .
Theorem 28 (Joint probability perturbation concentration). Consider a matrix δ ∈ Rk×k such
that, for every i0, j0 ∈ [k],
∑
j∈[k] δi0,j =
∑
i∈[k] δi,j0 = 0. Let random variables X = (X1, . . . ,Xk)
and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk) be independent and uniformly distributed over k-length binary sequences of
weight k/2. Define Z =
∑
(i,j)∈[k]×[k] δijXiYj. Then, there exist constants c1, c2, ρ > 0 such that
Pr
[
Z2
‖δ‖2F
∈ [c1, c2]
]
≥ ρ.
We provide the details of the proof of Theorem 28 in Appendix C. In particular, choosing δij :=
(p(i, j) − p1(i)p2(j)), we obtain the desired result as a corollary:
Corollary 29. Consider p ∈ ∆([k] × [k]) with marginals p1, p2 such that dTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2) ≥ γ. For
randomly chosen subsets S1 and S2, generated uniformly and independently over all subsets of [k]
of cardinality [k/2], there exist positive constants c and ρ such that
Pr
[
|p(S1 × S2)− p1(S1)p2(S2)| ≥ cdTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2)
k
]
≥ ρ .
Proof. Setting δij = (p(i, j) − p1(i)p2(j)) in Theorem 28, note that
Z =
∑
i,j
XiYj(p(i, j) − p1(i)p2(j)) = p(S1 × S2)− p1(S1)p2(S2)
and that
‖δ‖2F =
∑
i,j∈[k]
δ2i,j ≥
(∑
i,j∈[k] |δi,j|
)2
k2
≥ 4γ
2
k2
.
Thus, the claim follows from Theorem 28.
Finally, we show that the sample requirement for our mechanism is optimal for ε ∈ (0, 1]. The
proof is similar to that of Theorem 17, since the uniform distribution on [k]× [k] is also a product
distribution. The only caveat is that we need to ensure that each perturbed distribution is at total
variation distance at least γ from every product distribution, not only the uniform one. Fortunately,
we can get this using the following simple fact:
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Fact 30. Assume p is γ-close to some product distribution q ∈ ∆([k] × [k]). Then, p is γ-close to
the product distribution induced by its own marginals, i.e., dTV(p, p1 ⊗ p2) ≤ 3γ.
Consequently, to show that the perturbed distribution is γ-far from independent it is enough to
prove it is (3γ)-far from the product of its marginals, which in turn is immediate. This implies that
locally private independence testing is information-theoretically at least as hard as locally private
uniformity testing over [k]× [k] (i.e., over alphabet size k2), yielding the Ω (k2/(γ2ε2)) sample lower
bound. In summary, combining the upper and lower bounds we have shown the following result.
Theorem 31. There exists a symmetric, public-coin ε-LDP mechanism to test whether a distribu-
tion over [k]× [k] is a product distribution vs. γ-far from product using
O
(
k2
γ2ε2
)
samples. Furthermore, any ε-LDP mechanism for testing independence in this regime must use
Ω
(
k2
γ2ε2
)
samples.
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A Proof of Theorem 14
Theorem 32 (Probability perturbation concentration, restated). Consider a vector δ such that∑
i∈[k] δi = 0. Let random variables X1, . . . ,Xk be 4-symmetric and Z =
∑
i∈[k] δiXi. Then, for
every α ∈ (0, 1/4),
Pr
[(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)
−
√
38α
1− 2αE
[
X41
] ≤ Z2‖δ‖22 ≤
1
1− 2α
(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)]
≥ α.
Proof. Since X1,X2, . . . ,Xk are 4-symmetric, the expectations E[XaXbXcXd] depends only on the
number of times each distinct element appears in the multiset {a, b, c, d}. For ease of notation,
we replace the highest frequency element in {a, b, c, d} with 1, second highest with 2, and so on,
to obtain a representation S and denote mS := E[
∏
i∈S Xi]. For instance, E
[
X2a
]
= m{1,1} and
E[XaXb] = m{1,2} for distinct a, b. With this notation at our disposal, we are ready to proceed
with the proof.
Note first that
E[Z] =
∑
i∈[k]
δiE[Xi] = m{1}
∑
i∈[k]
δi = 0. (19)
Moreover, for the variance of Z, we have
Var(Z) = E
[
Z2
]
=
∑
i1,i2∈[k]
δi1δi2E[Xi1Xi2 ]
=
∑
i1∈[k]
δ2i1E
[
X2i1
]
+
∑
i1 6=i2
δi1δi2E[Xi1Xi2 ]
= m{1,1}‖δ‖22 +m{1,2}
∑
i6=j
δi1δi2
= m{1,1}‖δ‖22 +m{1,2}

( ∑
i∈[k]
δi
)2
−
∑
i∈[k]
δ2i


= (m{1,1} −m{1,2})‖δ‖22
=
(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)
‖δ‖22 , (20)
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where we used
∑
i∈[k] δi = 0 in the previous identity. It follows from Chebyshev’s inequality that
Pr
[
Z2 ≤ 1
1− 2α
(
E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2]
)
‖δ‖22
]
≥ 1− 2α.
For the lower tail bound, we derive a bound for E
[
Z4
]
and invoke the Paley–Zygmund inequality.
Specifically, we have
E
[
Z4
]
=
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4
δi1δi2δi3δi4E[Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4 ]
= m{1,1,1,1}Σ1 +m{1,1,1,2}Σ2,1 +m{1,1,2,2}Σ2,2 +m{1,1,2,3}Σ3 +m{1,2,3,4}Σ4,
where we have abbreviated
Σ1 = ‖δ‖44,
Σ2,1 = 4
∑
i1<i2
(
δ3i1δi2 + δ
3
i2δi1
)
,
Σ2,2 = 6
∑
i1<i2
δ2i1δ
2
i2 ,
Σ3 = 12
∑
i1<i2<i3
(
δ2i1δi2δi3 + δi1δ
2
i2δi3 + δi1δi2δ
2
i3
)
,
Σ4 = 24
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
δi1δi2δi3δi4 .
The expressions for Σ’s above can be simplified further by using
∑
i∈[k] δi = 0. Observe now that
Σ1 +Σ2,1 +Σ2,2 +Σ3 +Σ4 =
( ∑
i∈[k]
δi
)4
= 0.
Also, for Σ2,1 and Σ2,2, we obtain
Σ2,1 = 4
(∑
i
δi
∑
i
δ3i −
∑
i
δ4i
)
= −4‖δ‖44,
Σ2,2 = 3
(∑
i
δ2i
∑
i
δ2i −
∑
i
δ4i
)
= 3‖δ‖42 − 3‖δ‖44.
Finally, the expressions for Σ’s can be seen to satisfy,
(∑
i
δi
)2∑
i
δ2i =
∑
i
δ4i +
1
2
Σ2,1 +
1
3
Σ2,2 +
1
6
Σ3,
whereby
Σ3 = −6Σ1 − 3Σ2,1 − 2Σ2,2 = 12‖δ‖44 − 6‖δ‖42
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Combining the relations above, we obtain
E
[
Z4
]
=
(
m{1,1,1,1} − 4m{1,1,1,2} − 3m{1,1,2,2} + 12m{1,1,2,3} − 6m{1,2,3,4}
)‖δ‖44
+
(
3m{1,1,2,2} − 6m{1,1,2,3} + 3m{1,2,3,4}
)‖δ‖42
≤ (m{1,1,1,1} + 3m{1,1,2,2} + 15m{1,1,2,3})‖δ‖42.
Note that by symmetry
2(m{1,1,2,2} −m{1,1,2,3}) = E[X21 (X2 −X3)2] ≥ 0
and by symmetry and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
m{1,1,1,1} = E
[
X41
]
≥ E
[
X21X
2
2
]
= m{1,1,2,2}.
Therefore, the previous inequality yields
E
[
Z4
]
≤ 19E
[
X41
]
‖δ‖42 . (21)
We now take recourse to the Paley–Zygmund inequality, restated below:
Theorem 33 (Paley–Zygmund (Refined version)). Suppose U is a non-negative random variable
with finite variance. Then, for every θ ∈ [0, 1],
Pr[U > θE[U ] ] ≥ (1− θ)
2
E[U ]2
VarU + (1− θ)2E[U ]2 . (22)
Applying this to Z2 and substituting the bounds of Eqs. (20) and (21) above, and setting
θ := 1−
√
38α
1− 2α
√
E
[
X41
]‖δ‖42
(E
[
X21
]− E[X1X2])‖δ‖22 ≤ 1−
√
19α
1− 2α
√
E[Z4]
E[Z2]
,
we obtain
Pr
[
Z2 ≥ θ(E
[
X21
]
− E[X1X2])‖δ‖22
]
≥ (1− θ)
2(E
[
X21
]− E[X1X2])2‖δ‖42
19E
[
X41
]‖δ‖42 + (1− θ)2(E[X21 ]− E[X1X2])2‖δ‖42 = 2α ,
which completes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 34 (Variance of the Rappor-based estimator, restated). With T defined as in (10), we
have
Var(T ) ≤ 4kn2 + 8n3α2R‖p − u‖22 = 4kn2 + 8nE[T ] .
Proof of Lemma 10. Letting again λ := αRk + βR and λx :=
1
nE[Nx] = αRpx + βR for x ∈ [k], we
have
Var(T ) =
∑
x,y∈[k]
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny)) ,
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where f : [0,∞)→ R is given by f(t) = (t− (n − 1)λ)2 − t+ (n− 1)λ2.
The key difficulty in analysis arises from the fact that Rappor renders the multiplicities Nx’s
dependent random variable. They are negatively associated, but since f is not monotone this does
not imply that the cross covariance terms are non-positive. Thus, we need to take recourse to a
more direct, elaborate treatment.
Fix x 6= y in [k]. Expanding the covariance term, recalling E[f(Nx)] = n(n− 1)(λx − λ)2 from
the proof of Lemma 9 and abbreviating r := 2(n − 1)λ + 1 and m := n − 1, we obtain after a few
manipulations that
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny))
= E[(f(Nx)− E[f(Nx)])(f(Ny)− E[f(Ny)])]
= E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
− rE
[
N2xNy +NxN
2
y
]
+mnλy(2λ− λy)E
[
N2x
]
+mnλx(2λ− λx)E
[
N2y
]
+ r2E[NxNy]− rmn(λy(2λ− λy)E[Nx] + λx(2λ− λx)E[Ny])
+m2n2λxλy(2λ− λx)(2λ − λy)
= E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
− rE
[
N2xNy +NxN
2
y
]
− 2m2nλλy(2λ− λy)E[Nx] +m2λy(2λ− λy)E[Nx]2
− 2m2nλλx(2λ− λx)E[Ny] +m2λx(2λ− λx)E[Ny]2
+ r2E[NxNy] +m2n2λxλy(2λ− λx)(2λ − λy).
Substituting r − 1 = 2mλ and E
[
N2y
]
= E[Ny] + mn E[Ny]
2 in the previous identity, and similarly
for Nx, we get
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny))
= E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
− (2mλ+ 1)E
[
N2xNy +NxN
2
y
]
− 2m2λ(2λ− λy)E[Nx]E[Ny]
− 2m2λ(2λ− λx)E[Nx]E[Ny] +m2λx(2λ− λx)E[Ny]2 +m2λy(2λ− λy)E[Nx]2
+ (2mλ+ 1)2E[NxNy] +m2E[Nx]E[Ny](2λ− λx)(2λ− λy). (23)
We proceed by evaluating the expressions for E[NxNy], E
[
N2xNy
]
, E
[
NxN
2
y
]
, and E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
sepa-
rately.
Specifically, by Fact 7, we get
E[NxNy] =
∑
1≤i,j≤n
Pr[bix = 1,bjy = 1 ]
=
n∑
i=1
(λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)) +
∑
i6=j
λxλy
= n2λxλy − nα2Rp(x)p(y). (24)
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Turning to E
[
N2xNy
]
, we get
E
[
N2xNy
]
=
∑
1≤i,j,ℓ≤n
Pr[bix = 1,bjx = 1,bℓy = 1 ]
= nPr[bix = 1,biy = 1 ] + 6
(
n
3
)
λ2xλy + 2
(
n
2
)(
λxλy + 2λx(λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y))
)
= nλxλy − nα2Rp(x)p(y) + n(n− 1)(n − 2)λ2xλy
+ n(n− 1)λxλy + 2n(n− 1)λ2xλy − 2n(n− 1)α2Rλxp(x)p(y),
which yields
E
[
N2xNy
]
= n2λxλy − (2mλx + 1)nα2Rp(x)p(y) +mn2λ2xλy. (25)
For the last term, note that
E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
=
∑
1≤i,j,i′,j′≤n
Pr
[
bix = 1,bjx = 1,bi′y = 1,bj′y = 1
]
= n
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+
(
n
2
)(
2λxλy + 4λx
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+4λy
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+ 4
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)2)
+
(
n
3
)(
6λ2xλy + 6λxλ
2
y + 24λxλy
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
))
+ 24
(
n
4
)
λ2xλ
2
y
where the second identity follows from counting the different possibilities for the values taken by
i, i′, j, j′; we divide into cases based on the number of different values taken and apply Fact 7 for
each subcase. Note that the total number of terms is n+ 14
(n
2
)
+ 36
(n
3
)
+ 24
(n
4
)
= n4.
This after a tedious simplification leads to
E
[
N2xN
2
y
]
= n
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+mn
(
λxλy + 2λx
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+2λy
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)
+ 2
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
)2)
+mn(m− 1)
(
λ2xλy + λxλ
2
y + 4λxλy
(
λxλy − α2Rp(x)p(y)
))
+mn(m− 1)(m− 2)λ2xλ2y
= m2n2λ2xλ
2
y +mn
2(λ2xλy + λxλ
2
y) + n
2λxλy − 4α2Rm2np(x)p(y)λxλy
− 2α2Rmn (p(x)p(y)λx + p(x)p(y)λy) + 2α4Rmnp(x)2p(y)2 − α2Rnp(x)p(y) , (26)
Upon combining Eqs. (24) to (26) with (23) and further simplifying the expressions, we get
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny)) = 2α4Rn(n− 1)
(
p(x)2p(y)2 − 2(n − 1)p(x)p(y)
(
p(x)− 1k
) (
p(y)− 1k
))
.
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We proceed by summing both sides over pairs of distinct x, y ∈ [k] to obtain∑
x 6=y
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny))
= 2α4Rn(n− 1)
∑
x 6=y
p(x)2p(y)2 − 4α4Rn(n− 1)2
∑
x 6=y
p(x)p(y)
(
p(x)− 1k
) (
p(y)− 1k
)
= 2α4Rn(n− 1)
(
‖p‖42 − ‖p‖44
)
− 4α4Rn(n− 1)2

‖p− u‖42 − ∑
x∈[k]
p(x)2
(
p(x)− 1k
)2
≤ 2α4Rn2 + 4α4Rn(n− 1)2‖p − u‖22
≤ 2n2 + 4α2Rn(n− 1)2‖p − u‖22 ,
where we have used
∑
x∈[k] p(x)
(
p(x)− 1k
)
= ‖p‖22−1/k = ‖p− u‖22 and bounded the non-negative
terms.
This completes our bound for the cross-variance terms. Turning now to the variances, we note
that
Var(f(Nx)) = 2n(n− 1)λ2x(1− λx)2 + 4n(n− 1)2λx(1− λx)(λ− λx)2
≤ 1
8
n2 + α2Rn(n− 1)2
(
p(x)− 1k
)2
,
where the previous inequality holds since λx ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that
∑
x∈[k]
Var(f(Nx)) ≤ 18n
2k + α2Rn(n− 1)2‖p− u‖22 .
Putting everything together, we conclude
Var(T ) =
∑
x∈[k]
Var(f(Nx)) +
∑
x 6=y
Cov(f(Nx), f(Ny)) ≤ 178 n
2 + 5α2Rn(n− 1)2‖p− u‖22 ,
proving the lemma.
C Proof of Theorem 28
Theorem 35 (Joint probability perturbation concentration, restated). Consider a matrix δ ∈
R
k×k such that, for every i0, j0 ∈ [k],
∑
j∈[k] δi0,j =
∑
i∈[k] δi,j0 = 0. Let random variables X =
(X1, . . . ,Xk) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk) be independent and uniformly distributed over k-length binary
sequences of weight k/2. Define Z =
∑
(i,j)∈[k]×[k] δijXiYj . Then, there exist constants c1, c2, ρ > 0
such that
Pr
[
Z2
‖δ‖2F
∈ [c1, c2]
]
≥ ρ.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 14, with further technicalities difficulties arising
since the random variables (Xi, Yj) assigned as weights to δij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, are not 4-symmetric (as
a pair). However, δ has an additional structure since both its rows and columns sum to zero; we
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complete the proof by exploiting this property and the fact that Xi’s and Yj’s are individually 4-
symmetric. As before, we use the notation mS := E[
∏
i∈S Xi], and moreover, let m′S := E[
∏
i∈S Yi].
First, observe that by independence of Xi’s and Yj’s and since
∑
(i,j)∈[k]×[k] δij = 0, we have
E[Z] =
∑
(i,j)∈[k]×[k]
δijE[Xi]E[Yj] = m{1}m′{1}
∑
(i,j)∈[k]×[k]
δij = 0 .
Furthermore,
Var(Z) = E
[
Z2
]
=
∑
(i1,j1)∈[k]×[k]
∑
(i2,j2)∈[k]×[k]
δi1j1δi2j2E[Xi1Xi2 ]E[Yj1Yj2 ]
=
∑
i1,i2
E[Xi1Xi2 ]
∑
j1,j2
δi1j1δi2j2E[Yj1Yj2]
=
∑
i1,i2
E[Xi1Xi2 ]

m′{1,1}∑
j1
δi1j1δi2j1 +m
′
{1,2}
∑
j1 6=j2
δi1j1δi2j2


=
∑
i1,i2
E[Xi1Xi2 ]
(
(m′{1,1} −m′{1,2})
∑
j
δi1jδi2j +m
′
{1,2}
(∑
j
δi1j
)2)
= (m′{1,1} −m′{1,2})
∑
i1,i2
∑
j
δi1jδi2jE[Xi1Xi2 ] ,
where the previous identity uses
∑
j δi1j = 0. Repeating the same manipulations with the outer
sum, we get
Var(Z) = E
[
Z2
]
= (m′{1,1} −m′{1,2})
∑
j
(
m{1,1}
∑
i
δ2ij +m{1,2}
∑
i1 6=i2
δi1jδi2j
)
= (m′{1,1} −m′{1,2})
∑
j
(
(m{1,1} −m{1,2})
∑
i
δ2ij +m{1,2}
(∑
i
δi,j
)2)
= (m{1,1} −m{1,2})(m′{1,1} −m′{1,2})‖δ‖2F .
Up to this point, our calculations are valid for any independent choice of 4-symmetric (X1, . . . ,Xk)
and (Y1, . . . , Yk). For our specific choice, using calculations from the proof of Corollary 15, we
obtain the following:
1
16
‖δ‖2F ≤ Var(Z) =
1
4
E
[
(X1 −X2)2
]
E
[
(Y1 − Y2)2
]
‖δ‖2F ≤
1
4
‖δ‖2F .
It remains to bound the fourth moment of Z; for simplicity, we provide this proof only for our
specific choice of random variables. We have
E
[
Z4
]
=
∑
(i1,j1)
∑
(i2,j2)
∑
(i3,j3)
∑
(i4,j4)
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j4E[Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4 ]E[Yj1Yj2Yj3Yj4]
=
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4
E[Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4 ]
∑
j1,j2,j3,j4
E[Yj1Yj2Yj3Yj4]δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j4 .
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Consider the inner summation for an arbitrary fixed choice of i1, i2, i3, i4. We show first that the
inner summation can be expressed as
αk
∑
j
δi1jδi2jδi3jδi4j + βk
∑
j
δi1jδi2j ·
∑
j
δi3jδi4j, (27)
for appropriate coefficients αk and βk. To that end, we introduce the notations: For ℓ ≤ 4, denote
pℓ(j1, . . . , jℓ) := Pr[Yj1 = 1, . . . , Yjℓ = 1 ]
pℓ(j1, . . . , jℓ−1) := Pr
[
Yjℓ = 1 | Yj1 = 1, . . . , Yjℓ−1 = 1
]
, jℓ /∈ {j1, . . . , jℓ−1},
pℓ(j1, . . . , jm) := Pr
[
Yjℓ = 1 | Yj1 = 1, . . . , Yjm = 1, Yjm+1 = 1, . . . , Yjℓ−1 = 1
]
,
jr /∈ {j1, . . . , jm}, jr distinct for m+ 1 < r ≤ ℓ,
and the corresponding notation qℓ(j1, . . . , jm) := 1−pℓ(j1, . . . , jm). With this in hand, we can write∑
j1,j2,j3,j4
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j4E[Yj1Yj2Yj3Yj4]
=
∑
j1,j2,j3
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3

 ∑
j4∈{j1,j2,j3}
δi4j4E[Yj1Yj2Yj3] +
∑
j4 /∈{j1,j2,j3}
δi4j4E[Yj1Yj2Yj3Yj4]


=
∑
j1,j2,j3
p3(j1, j2, j3)δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3

 ∑
j4∈{j1,j2,j3}
δi4j4 + p4(j1, j2, j3)
∑
j4 /∈{j1,j2,j3}
δi4j4


=
∑
j1,j2,j3
p3(j1, j2, j3)q4(j1, j2, j3)δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3
∑
j4∈{j1,j2,j3}
δi4j4 ,
where we have used
∑
j δi4,j = 0 in the previous identity. Next, note that each term in the sum
above has, by symmetry, the form∑
j1,j2,j3
p3(j1, j2, j3)q4(j1, j2, j3)δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j1
=
∑
j1,j2
p2(j1, j2)
(
q3(j1, j2)
∑
j3∈{j1,j2}
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j1 + p3(j1, j2)q4(j1, j2)
∑
j3 /∈{j1,j2}
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j1
)
=
∑
j1,j2
p2(j1, j2)
(
1− p3(j1, j2)
(
1 + q4(j1, j2)
)) ∑
j3∈{j1,j2}
δi1j1δi2j2δi3j3δi4j1 ,
where we have once again used
∑
j3 δi3,j3 = 0 to obtain the last line from the second-to-last. This
leaves us with terms of the form∑
j1,j2
p2(j1, j2)
(
1− p3(j1, j2)
(
1 + q4(j1, j2)
))
(δi1j1δi2j2δi3j1δi4j1 + δi1j1δi2j2δi3j2δi4j1) .
Finally, splitting the summation above into terms with j1 = j2 and j1 6= j2, we end up with terms
of the form (27). Note that the resulting coefficients αk, βk entail terms dependent on k which can
be handled and bounded (crucially, independently of k) in the manner of proof of Corollary 15.
To complete the proof, we handle each term in (27) separately. For the first, we obtain
∑
j
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4
δi1jδi2jδi3jδi4jE[X1X2X3X4] ≤ 19E
[
X41
]∑
j
(∑
i
δ2ij
)2
≤ 19E
[
X41
]
‖δ‖2F ,
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where the inequality uses (21). For the second term, note that
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4
Xi1Xi2Xi3Xi4
∑
j
δi1jδi2j ·
∑
j′
δi3j′δi4j′ =
(∑
j
(∑
i
Xiδij
)2)2
,
whereby the expected value of the left-side can be bounded by
E



∑
j
(∑
i
Xiδij
)2
2

 =∑
j,j′
E

(∑
i
Xiδij
)2 (∑
i
Xiδij′
)2
≤
∑
j,j′
√√√√√E


(∑
i
Xiδij
)4E


(∑
i
Xiδij′
)4
≤ 19E
[
X41
]∑
j,j′
‖δ·,j‖22‖δ·,j′‖22,
where the final inequality uses (21). The sum on the right-side can be seen to simplify as
∑
j,j′
‖δ·,j‖22‖δ·,j′‖22 =
∑
j,j′
∑
i
δ2i,j
∑
i
δ2i,j′ =

∑
ij
δ2i,j


2
= ‖δ‖4F .
Therefore, on combining the observations above, we obtain
E
[
Z4
]
≤ c′‖δ‖4F ,
for an appropriate absolute constant c′. The proof is completed in the manner of that of Theorem 14
using the Paley–Zygmund inequality.
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